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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to examine "The Jackson 
Doctrine," Jesse Jackson's foreign policy. The study focuses 
upon three regions of the world which Jackson has consistently 
gone to great lengths to mention and discuss in his speeches 
and writings: the Middle East, Central America and Africa.
From Jackson's foreign policy leanings with regard to the 
three aforementioned regions, a theory of what constitutes the 
underlying principles of Jackson's foreign policy is drawn.
The underlying principles of Jackson's foreign policy are 
that it puts emphasis on the need to promote human rights and 
to further human fulfillment and well-being. It also puts 
emphasis on the need to consider the interests of all nations 
and to be consistent in its application. Also, it is not 
based upon a foundation as shaky as the fear of communist 
advancement. Jesse Jackson argues for a U.S. foreign policy 
which is balanced and consistent and is part of a global 
struggle for true and total equality.
AN EXAMINATION OF 'THE JACKSON DOCTRINE:' 
JESSE JACKSON'S FOREIGN POLICY
1INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE:
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the foreign 
policy stances taken by Jesse Jackson before, during and 
after his presidential campaigns of 1984 and 1988.
According to Aaron Wildavsky, the nature of the American 
political system encourages the president to assume a 
dominant role in foreign affairs. Presidents tend to get 
their way in the foreign policy realm far more often than in 
the domestic one.1 Knowing that Jesse Jackson represents 
the first viable black American presidential candidate, and 
that the President of the United States is pre-disposed to 
achieve a dominant role in foreign affairs, an examination 
of Jackson's foreign policy stances is warranted.
In his writings, speeches and debates, Jackson has 
often taken the time to discuss foreign policy. This thesis 
will begin with a brief biographical sketch of Jesse
1 Aaron Wildavsky, "The Two Presidencies,1 in Wildavsky, 
ed., Perspectives on the Presidency (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Co., 1975.), 452.
2
3Jackson. It will proceed to examine the three regions of 
the world which have been the primary foci of Jackson's 
foreign policy discussion: 1) the Middle East; 2) Central 
America; and 3) Africa. Then a theory of what constitutes 
the underlying principles that guide Jesse Jackson's foreign 
policy will be presented.
JESSE JACKSON: A BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH:
Jesse Louis Burns was born on October 8, 1941. His 
mother, Helen Burns, was a teenager; his father was Noah 
Robinson, a married man and father of three who lived next 
door to Burns. Jesse Burns became Jesse Jackson when he was 
two years old and his mother married Charles Jackson.3
Jackson grew up in segregated Greenville, North 
Carolina where he learned that he was expected to be 
subservient and inferior to whites.4 He began to question 
the need to separate the races at a very young age, about 
the same time that he learned the meaning of white 
supremacy.
Two of Jackson's childhood experiences taught him the 
meaning of white supremacy. When he was six years old he 
entered a neighborhood store to buy some candy. The grocer
3 Anna Kosof, Jesse Jackson (New York: Franklin Watts, 
1987), 17-19.
4 Ibid., 19.
was waiting on customers at the time; Jackson, who was in a
rush, whistled at the grocer to get his attention.
Suddenly Jack (the grocer) wheeled around, reached under 
the counter for a gun, and pointed it at Jesse's face. 
"Don't ever whistle at a white man again as long as you 
live," he said.5
The second experience of Jackson's childhood which 
taught him white supremacy was a boxing match. The bout was 
between a black champion, Joe Louis, and a white man. Jesse 
and his friends listened to the match at a cigar store, but 
they did not show emotion. They were too scared to cheer 
for a black man who was beating up his white opponent 
because it would have angered the white shopkeeper and his 
friends.6
Another of Jackson's childhood influences was his 
grandmother, affectionately known as Aunt Tibby. Among the 
lessons she taught the young Jesse were the importance of 
literacy, books and education and the need to avoid 
violence.7 The most important lesson she taught Jesse, 
though, was:
"(i)f you fall, boy, you don't have to wallow. Ain't 
nobody going to think you somebody, unless you think so 
yourself. Don't listen to their talk, boy; they don't 
have a pot to pee in or a window to throw it out.
For God's sake, Jesse, promise me you'll be somebody. 
Ain't no such thing as cain’t, cain't got drowned in a
5 Dorothy Chaplick, Up with Hope (Minnesota: Dillon
Press, Inc., 1990), 14.
6 Barbara Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: the Man. the Movement, 
the Mvth (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1975), 26.
7 Chaplick, 15.
5soda bottle. Don't let the Joneses get you down.
Nothing is impossible for those who love the Lord. Come 
hell or high water, if you got the guts, boy, ain't 
nothing or nobody can turn you around."®
Sports also had a major impact on his early 
development. Jackson was a star athlete in football and 
baseball at Sterling High School in Greenville. Upon 
graduation he was offered $6,000 to play for the American 
League's Chicago White Sox, but he turned the offer down 
when he learned that an inferior white ballplayer was 
offered $90,000 by the club.9
Instead of playing major-league baseball, Jackson 
accepted an athletic scholarship to attend the University of 
Illinois in Chicago. Jackson was appalled to learn that he 
could not play quarterback because that was a position 
reserved for whites. Having experienced racism in the 
North, and being generally unhappy with the racial division 
at the University of Illinois, Jackson transferred to the 
black Agriculture and Technical College of North Carolina at 
Greensboro where he became a star quarterback, won numerous 
academic honors, began active involvement and leadership in 
the civil rights movement and met his future wife,
Jacqueline Davis.10
8 Reynolds, 28.
9 Kosof, 24.
10 Ibid.
6Once in Greensboro, Jesse joined the Congress of Racial 
Equality and began to* lead sit-ins, picket lines and mass 
demonstrations in the fight for the integration of blacks 
and whites. He was arrested at various times for his 
involvement with the protests, but his leadership helped end 
racial segregation in Greensboro. In fact, "to honor his 
achievement, the governor of North Carolina appointed him to 
the state's student council on human rights."11
At a march in Selma in 1965, Jackson assumed an active 
leadership role. His enthusiasm, energy and effectiveness 
so impressed Ralph Abernathy that he encouraged Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr. to hire the young man. Jackson was put in 
charge of Operation Breadbasket, the economic arm of King's 
Southern Christian Leadership Council (SCLC).12
Through Jackson's initiative, Operation Breadbasket 
undertook Operation Boycott. Under this operation, if 
companies did not hire a significant number of blacks, did
not deal with companies owned by blacks and did not have
blacks in management positions, Jackson's followers would 
boycott them and would no longer purchase goods or services 
from them. Operation Boycott, aimed at the pocketbooks of 
companies, had substantial influence and success, 
particularly in Chicago.13
11 Chaplick, 29.
12 Ibid., 31.
13 Ibid., 31-32.
7Two years after the assassination of Martin Luther 
King, Jackson left the SCLC to form his own organization.
The organization was named PUSH or People United to Serve 
Humanity. The program of PUSH was intended to fight for 
economic rights for blacks since the battle for basic civil 
rights had already been won. The new program called for 
better jobs, good medical care, quality education, improved 
living conditions and more opportunities for black 
businesses to grow and prosper.14
Throughout the 1970s, Jackson became increasingly 
visible as a leader of and spokesman for black America. He 
toured and spoke both in the United States and elsewhere in 
the world, always attracting listeners with his impressive 
oratory skills and his populist messages, while 
simultaneously attracting attention to his causes and to 
himself. Despite never holding public office, by early 1983 
it became evident that Jackson was going to run for the 1984 
presidential nomination of the Democratic Party. And run he 
did, both in 1984 and again in 1988.
Jesse Jackson was, and still is, the first viable 
African-American candidate for the office of the President 
of the United States. Although a few black candidates had 
run for President previously, for many he "represented the 
first Black American whose candidacy for president had to be
14 Kosof, 63.
8taken seriously."15 Jackson's "effort to secure the 
Democratic presidential nomination in 1984 and 1988 were the 
first serious presidential campaigns mounted by an African- 
American candidate."16 For the first time in American 
history, a black candidate could and would play an 
influential role in a presidential election.
15 Katherine Tate, "Bloc Voters, Black Voters, and the 
Jackson Candidacies," paper presented at the 1990 Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 8.
16 John Bruce and Charles Smith, "Jesse Jackson's Impact 
on the 1988 Nomination Process," paper presented at the 1990 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
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THE MIDDLE EAST
INTRODUCTION:
Jesse Jackson has never been at a loss of words when it 
comes to the Middle East and U.S. Middle East foreign 
policy. His actions in, and comments about, the region have 
been numerous, he met with Yasir Arafat in the 1970s, was 
responsible for getting issues from the region onto the 
agenda in his campaigns to secure the Democratic 
presidential nomination in 1984 and 1988 and has taken every 
opportunity to discuss Middle East foreign policy in the 
media. This section will examine four factors which lead to 
an understanding of Jesse Jackson*s Middle East policy: 1) 
his relationship with the American Jewish community; 2) his 
views on the Palestiriian-Israeli conflict? 3) his attempts 
to secure the freedom of hostages being held in the Middle 
East; and 4) his evaluation of U.S. Middle East policy.
9
JESSE JACKSON AND THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY:
10
In examining Jesse Jackson's views of the Middle East, 
one needs to begin by looking at his relationship with the 
American Jewish community. Jackson's relationship with the 
Jewish community has been profoundly affected by the Middle 
East policy which he advocates. This relationship is 
particularly important to examine when considering the 
deleterious effect the lack of Jewish support had on his 
1984 and 1988 presidential campaigns. Was Jackson's Middle 
East policy formed by or affected by his need to generate a 
wide base of support in the Democratic primaries?
First of all, it should be noted that there has been a 
historical conflict between the African-American and Jewish 
communities in the United States. This African- 
American/ Jewish conflict comes from two main sources: "(1) 
competition within the professional apparatus of social 
administration? and (2) black encroachment - via extension 
of the logic of affirmative action as an elite mobility 
strategy - on enclaves of relative Jewish privilege in 
education and elsewhere."17 Black activism in the 1960s 
created the contraposition of African-Americans as clients 
of service agencies and institutions and Jews as 
professional service providers. This relation was 
exacerbated by the tension created by upwardly mobile blacks
17 Adolph L. Reed, Jr., The Jesse Jackson Phenomenon (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 94-95.
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seeking to carve out niches for themselves in the public 
service apparatus, which threatened the positions of the 
relatively entrenched Jews.18
This is not to say that blacks and Jews are always on 
opposing sides, however. As is commonly known, coalition- 
building makes for interesting bedfellows. Jews and 
African-Americans have often come together with a shared 
commitment to positions of democratic principle which have 
worked to further the interests of both communities. For 
years, it was a very close relationship on social issues.
The African-American and Jewish populations worked together, 
for example, to break down prejudicial attitudes and 
barriers which confronted the communities in America. 
However, as the interests of the black elite have become 
more and more uncoupled from those of the Jewish elite, the 
foundation of the alliance has become more and more 
unsteady.19
The perception of Jackson's anti-Semitism became one of 
the major issues in his campaign to secure the presidential 
nomination of the Democratic Party in 1984. In what has 
been termed the "most difficult gaffe" for Jackson in that 
campaign, the candidate made reference to Jews as "Hymies"
18 Ibid. , 95.
19 Ibid. , 98.
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and New York as "Hymietown. I|2° in what he considered to be 
off-the-record comments to two black reporters, Jackson made 
the reference to "Hymies." One of the reporters, Milton 
Coleman, included Jackson's comments in an article he wrote 
for The Washington Post.2' Although Jackson first denied 
ever making the reference, he came out with a public apology 
for the remarks towards the end of the campaign.22 He 
stated that "(i)n private talks we sometimes let our guard 
down and we become thoughtless. It was not in a spirit of 
meanness, an off-color remark having no bearing on religion 
or politics ... however innocent, it was wrong."23 The 
"Hymie" incident magnified the underlying tensions and 
antipathies between the African-American and Jewish 
communities over matters such as affirmative action programs 
as well as policy issues relating to Israel.
In addition to his reference- to Jews as "Hymies," a 
photograph appeared in the New York Times showing Jesse 
Jackson embracing Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat.24 Jesse 
Jackson's meeting with Arafat, leader of the Palestine
20 Lucius J. Barker and Ronald Walters, eds. Jesse 
Jackson's 1984 Presidential Campaign (Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 1989), 240.
21 Bob Faw and Nancy Skelton, Thunder in America (Austin: 
Texas Monthly Press, 1986), 48-49.
22 Tom Morgenthau, "Jackson's Albatross," Newsweek, 2 3 
April 1984.
23 Faw and Skelton, 52.
24 Barker and Walters, 240.
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Liberation Organization, further led "many Jews to express 
the view that he was anti-Semitic.1,25 By meeting with 
Arafat, Jackson was depicted not only as pro-Palestinian, 
but also as anti-Israeli, which did not endear him to the 
American Jewish community.
Further adding to the tension between Jackson and the 
Jews was his acceptance of Arab money in the form of 
campaign contributions.26 The Arab League, an organization 
of Arab nations aimed at promoting closer political, 
economic, cultural and social relations among its member 
countries of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya, Yemen,
Egypt, Syria and a few others, had contributed over $100,000 
to Jackson*s Chicago organizations in 1981 alone.27 In a 
span of three years, the Arab League contributed over 
$2 00,000 to Jackson*s campaign.28 The fact that Jackson was 
the recipient of financial contributions from Arabs served 
to call his loyalties into question, once again, decreasing 
his popularity with the American Jewish community.
Jesse Jackson*s relationship with Nation of Islam 
leader Louis Farrakhan was another controversial aspect
25 Paul Taylor, "Jackson Interview Aims to Heal Rift With 
Jews, but Some See More Controversy," Washington Post, 15 
October 1987.
26 Reed, 102.
27 Thomas Landess and Richard Quinn, Jesse Jackson & the 
Politics of Race (Illinois: Jameson Books, 1985), 207.
28 Michael Kramer, "What to Make of 'New'* Jesse," U.S. 
News and World Report, 16 November 1987.
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which came to the forefront of his 1984 campaign.29 Jesse 
Jackson was unwilling to repudiate or to disassociate 
himself from Minister Farrakhan, one of his earliest and 
strongest supporters. Farrakhan openly warned Jews that 
there would be retaliation if they harmed "this brother," 
Jesse Jackson. In a broadcast made on March 11, 1984, 
Farrakhan stated: "the Jews don't like Farrakhan, so they 
call me Hitler. Well, that's a good name. Hitler was a 
very great man." One month later Farrakhan again referred 
to Hitler saying that "(h)e was indeed a great man, but also 
wicked - wickedly great."30 Farrakhan also made reference 
to Judaism as "a gutter religion."31 These views, openly 
expressed by Farrakhan, deeply upset the American Jewish 
community, which was further angered by Jackson's failure to 
repudiate the Muslim leader. Jackson, however, was in a 
unenviable position. If he did repudiate Farrakhan in hopes 
of getting Jewish support, he might have been perceived as 
selling out to whites, which would have caused him to lose 
the support of blacks whose votes he desperately needed.
In his address before the Democratic National 
Convention in 1984, Jesse Jackson made a plea for 
forgiveness hoping to end the tension created by such 
unfortunate incidents as his "Hymietown" comment and his
29 Barker and Walters, 101.
30 Kramer.
31 Taylor.
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relationships with Arafat and Farrakhan. This plea, 
however, fell on deaf ears as spokepersons from such 
organizations as the American Jewish Congress, the Synagogue 
Council of America and the Anti-Defamation League chose to 
remain unsympathetic.32
Jesse Jackson's 1984 campaign for the Democratic 
presidential nomination met with opposition from the 
American Jewish community on three levels. Adolph Reed 
defines the three levels of the "anti-Jackson diatribe" in 
this way:
Most overt was castigation of his anti-Semitic 
statements and his link to Farrakhan. Then his 
association with Arafat and receipt of Arab money 
simultaneously reinforced the image of black support of 
genocide against Jews and the notion that criticism of 
Israel equals anti-Semitism. Finally, and invariably, 
came reaffirmation of Jewish opposition to affirmative 
action quotas.33
The rift between Jackson and the Jewish community 
persisted even after the conclusion of the 1984 campaign.
As late as 1987 Jackson was still trying to heal this 
division. In October of 1987 Jackson gave an in-depth 
interview to the liberal Jewish magazine Tikkun. Through 
the interview, the once-again Democratic presidential 
hopeful intended to "mend his troubled relationship with the
32 Reed, 103.
33 Ibid., 102.
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Jewish community."34 To do so, he reaffirmed his stances
on the nation of Israel. Jackson stated:
America has a special relationship with Israel. This 
relationship must continue. America helped to found 
Israel. America helps to sustain it with outright 
annual grants. America's interest and will to protect 
Israel is substantial and seems unequivocal.35
However, Jackson was also quick to point out that the United
States had other interests in the Middle East as well.
Jackson also reaffirmed his belief that the Israelis
had a right to the land they occupied. He said:
The Jews had need of a homeland, and the political 
settlement was reached. I accept the political 
settlement as reality.36
He also went on, though, to speak on behalf of the
Palestinians. He argued that the failure to "work out an
accord on getting a homeland for Palestinians" was a "crisis
that 1 ingers. "37
In the interview Jackson did criticize such things as
Israel's provision of military and economic aid to South
Africa. He also avoided directly repudiating black Muslim
leader Louis Farrakhan, a repudiation most Jews wanted.
34 Taylor.
35 "A Dialogue with Jesse Jackson," Tikkun, 27 October 
1987, 36.
36 Ibid. , 38.
37 Ibid.
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However, Jackson did state that Farrakhan "(c)ailing Judaism 
a gutter religion is wrong."38
The response of the Jewish community to the Jackson 
interview was varied. Some Jewish leaders felt this offer 
of friendship was genuine, while others cited Jackson's 
ambivalence and ambiguities on certain issues. Other Jewish 
leaders saw Jackson making a concerted effort to "sensitize 
himself to the Jewish perspective;" these leaders accused 
Jewish people of responding with "insensitivity and 
harshness" to the overture. Of the first six published 
Jewish responses to the interview, three were critical of 
Jackson and three were supportive. For Jackson, this 
represented "progress" because he felt that in 1984 the 
Jewish community would have been unanimously critical.39
The Jackson interview in Tikkun, along with his 
pronouncements that Louis Farrakhan would not be a part of 
his 1988 campaign, were intended to decrease Jewish 
opposition and to increase Jewish support for him as he once 
again tried to secure the presidential nomination of the 
Democratic Party. On June 22, 1988, Democratic parties in 
seven states called for self-determination for the 
Palestinian peoples, many urging the creation of a separate 
Palestinian state. These moves were reportedly prompted by
38 Ibid., 41.
39 Ibid.
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the presidential campaign of Jesse Jackson.40 This sparked 
a re-emergence of Jewish antagonisms towards the Jackson 
campaign and Jackson himself.
Ira Silverman, executive vice president of the American 
Jewish Committee, in response to the actions of the seven 
states, commented: "We're deeply troubled by any outcropping 
of the kinds of views we are seeing in some of these states. 
But I am confident they do not reflect American opinion in 
general, nor the mainstream of the Democratic Party."41 
The black/Jewish antagonisms that were a part of Jackson's 
1984 campaign were reopened through the debate over the 
Palestinian issue.
On May 30, 1988, Jackson made an appeal for Jews and 
African-Americans to find common ground in their "histories 
of suffering." Jackson, recalling that black soldiers were 
the first to reach and liberate Jews in the Nazi 
concentration camps, said that Jews and blacks had a 
historic bond in that they "met each other, in a very real 
sense, at the door of the concentration camps."42 Jesse 
Jackson was still trying to mend the differences between 
blacks and Jews, differences which his 1984 and 1988 
campaigns helped to bring into the public eye.
40 William E. Schmidt, "Democrats Back Palestinians At 7 
State Party Conventions," New York Times, 23 June 1988.
41 Ibid.
42 Karen Tumulty, "Jackson Urges Blacks, Jews to Find 
'Common Ground,'" Los Angeles Times, 31 June 1988.
19
In early January, 1990, Jackson once again found 
himself in trouble with the American Jewish community. In a 
prayer service for New York Mayor David Dinkins, Jackson 
"mentioned the unmentionable: Peace meets brutality in the 
Middle East. The birthplace of Jesus the Christ is under 
occupation.1,43 Jewish leaders were infuriated that 
Jackson took the occasion to attack Israel by making such 
statements. Others questioned why Jackson needed to bring 
up the issue at all.44 The Jewish community and Jackson 
remained on opposite sides.
It is obvious that Jesse Jackson's policy stances, 
beliefs and actions concerning the Middle East were 
uninfluenced by his need to generate the support of American 
Jews in his quests to secure the Democratic presidential 
nomination in 1984 and 1988. His views have remained 
constant despite the fact that they have proven detrimental 
to his campaigns by alienating the politically active and 
influential Jewish members of the Democratic Party.
Although the antagonisms between Jackson and the American 
Jewish community, which are rooted in part in an historical 
conflict between the blacks and the Jews, have continued, 
Jackson has made numerous attempts to heal the rift. These 
attempts have proven unsuccessful, partly because Jackson's
43 Richard Cohen, "What Jesse Jackson Said," Washington 
Post, 9 January 1990.
44 Ibid.
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opinions concerning events in the Middle East have remained 
constant. As long as Jackson fights for the rights of 
Palestinians, a fight which includes an implicit critique of 
Israel, he will have great difficulty generating the support 
of the American Jewish community.
JESSE JACKSON AND THE PALESTINIANS:
The Palestinians are a people without a home. In 1948, 
Israel took the land that was to have comprised a 
Palestinian state. Although many Palestinians have left the 
area which was incorporated into Israel, others chose to 
remain.45 The occupation of what was to be Palestinian 
land by Israel has produced a Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
and, in a broader sense, an Arab-Israeli conflict.
Jesse Jackson has long been a vocal supporter of the 
cause of the Palestinians. This was evident when, in 1979, 
Jackson met with and embraced Yasir Arafat, leader of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.). At a time when 
few nations or people were willing to recognize the P.L.O. 
as anything other than a terrorist group, Jackson met with 
Arafat as if he was the spokesman of a legitimate people 
with a legitimate claim to their homeland.
On March 13, 1987, Jackson called for an international 
peace conference on the Middle East that would include the
45 James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the 
Middle East (Glenview: Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 
1990), 325.
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United States, the Soviet Union and Israel. The agenda of 
this proposed conference, according to Jackson, would 
include discovering measures which would guarantee a 
sovereign state for the Palestinians as well as a guarantee 
of the security of Israel within internationally recognized 
boundaries. In the words of Jackson: "We must never lose 
hope that the Palestinian people will become a sovereign 
state and a Palestinian citizen will have a passport from 
his own country."46
On December 22 of that same year Jesse Jackson called 
for a change in American policy in the Middle East. He 
stated that the current U.S. policy left Israel with only 
false security and the Palestinians with no security at all. 
Jackson stated the need for a new "Middle East peace 
formula" which would require mutual recognition on the part 
of Israel and the Palestinians. Jackson argued that "Israel 
must be guaranteed security within internationally 
recognized boundaries, and Palestinians must have the same 
rights as all others to self-determination and a homeland or 
state. "47
In an interview with the Christian Science Monitor on 
March 2, 1988, Jesse Jackson stated that if he became 
President of the United States, the first thing that he
46 James Dickenson, "Middle East Peace Talks Proposed by 
Jackson," Washington Post, 14 March 1987.
47 "Jackson Makes Plea On the Middle East At Holiday 
Season," New York Times, 23 December 1987.
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would do to unravel the problems in the Middle East would be 
to try to solve the.Palestinian-Israeli problem. He would 
hope to accomplish this by convening the leadership of, and 
opening discussion between, the two sides which he perceived 
as "locked in a death grip,” bound by mutual fear, distrust 
and hatred and on the road to mutual annihilation.48 By 
stating that the Palestinian issue was his number one 
priority in the Middle East, Jackson was showing his immense 
concern for the Palestinians as well as illustrating his 
belief that the solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
was the first step to solving the problems of the entire 
region.
Later that same month, Jackson once again displayed his 
sympathy and concern for the Palestinians. He called for 
mutual recognition between the Israelis and the Palestinians 
so that they could live side by side "as opposed to one 
living on the other."49 Jackson, it should be noted, was 
quick to assure both sides of the conflict of his concern.
In June 1988, despite the fact that law prohibited the 
United States from speaking to or negotiating with the 
Palestine Liberation Organization, Jackson stated that 
sooner or later the U.S. would be forced to speak with the
48 Tom Hughes, "Jesse Jackson: the Overlooked Front-
Runner," Christian Science Monitor, 3 March 1988.
49 Wolf Blitzer, "Israel's Reliance on U.S. Prompts 
Interest in Presidential Race," Christian Science Monitor, 29 
March 1988.
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P.L.O. After once again stating his support for the 
Palestinian state, Jesse Jackson argued that "the P.L.O. is 
by far the most representative organization of the 
Palestinian people."50
A few days later Jackson argued that the United States 
had lost any ability to influence events in the Middle East 
by not meeting with the P.L.O. He stated that "in the case 
of the P.L.O. we have opted not to talk. Since we can't 
talk we canft act, and if we can't act, we can't 
influence. "51
As previously mentioned, Jackson's campaign in 1988 
compelled seven Democratic state party conventions to voice 
their support for the Palestinians and a Palestinian 
homeland. The state parties of Illinois, Vermont, 
Washington, Maine, Oregon, Texas and Minnesota not only 
called for Palestinian self-determination, they also hoped 
to make this concept one of the planks of the national 
Democratic Party platform.52
In December of 1988, Jackson wrote that, even though 
there was not yet peace in Bethlehem, there was for perhaps 
the first time the hope for peace. This hope came from the 
fact that the Reagan Administration had agreed to engage in
50 "Jackson's Views: Excerpts From an Interview," New York 
Times, 16 April 1988.
51 Robert Shogan, "U.S. Stance on PLO Limits Mideast Role,
Jackson Says," Los Angeles Times, 17 April 1988.
52 Schmidt.
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substantive discussions with the P.L.O. following the
P.L.O.1s decision to recognize Israel's right to exist.
Jackson applauded this step as courageous. According to
Jackson, the peace formula would have to include Palestinian
self-determination and security for Israel, "two sides of
the same coin." He wrote that
[a] new olive branch has been raised. Its tender shoots
must be nourished if they are to grow strong and
verdant. Peace is not the work of a few - it is a 
calling for all who are inspired by its promise. Let us
act now so that someday soon the bells will ring again
in Bethlehem, so that peace will heal the land.
In just one year's time, Jackson's 'new olive branch' 
lay withered and trampled because peace-promoting activities 
failed to materialize. In a column for the Los Angeles 
Times, Jesse Jackson wrote that there was still no peace in 
Jerusalem and the Israelis and Palestinians remained tangled 
in a conflict promoting mutual destruction. He wrote that, 
on average, "one person - an Israeli or a Palestinian - is 
killed every day, someone's son, daughter, father, mother, 
brother, or sister. That means one family tragedy every day 
in the occupied territories."54
Jackson went on to state that the U.S. can provide the 
means and the impetus for breaking the death grip. He 
suggested that the best way to do this would be for
53 Jesse Jackson, "In Bethlehem, Hope for Peace," Los 
Angeles Times, 22 December 1988.
54 Jesse Jackson, "For A Season of Peace, Call on a Man 
of Peace," Los Angeles Times, 17 December 1989.
President Bush to appoint former President Jimmy Carter as 
'special ambassador to the Middle East.1 Jackson noted that 
Carter had been actively "mediating conflicts all over the 
world in the past few years," as well as the fact that it 
was Carter who brought the sworn enemies Egypt and Israel to 
the negotiating table and helped to forge a peace between 
them at Camp David.55
From his early meeting with Yasir Arafat right up 
through his suggestion to name Jimmy Carter as a special 
ambassador to the Middle East, Jesse Jackson's views of the 
Palestinians and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict have 
remained constant. He has continually supported the right 
of Palestinian self-determination; it is important to state 
that he has always also argued for the security of the 
nation of Israel. This continuity is quite remarkable 
considering that his stance on the Palestinians has been 
part of the problems between himself and the American Jewish 
population which have hurt his campaigns for the Democratic 
presidential nominations.
JESSE JACKSON'S CONCERN FOR AMERICAN HOSTAGES;
Jesse Jackson has been able to shine in the spotlight 
of the Middle East at various times by attempting to secure 
the freedom of hostages being held in the region. Jackson 
has been able to get publicity in the United States; his
55 Ibid.
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successes have illustrated that, in some parts of the Middle 
East on some issues, the Reverend Jackson carries clout.
On December 6, 1983, Lieutenant Robert Goodman's 
airplane was shot down over Lebanon while he was conducting 
a reconnaissance flight. The black Navy flier was taken 
prisoner and was being held in a Syrian prison camp. Soon 
afterwards, Jackson went to Syria to negotiate directly for 
the release of Goodman.56
The announcement that Jackson was going to go to Syria 
met with very little encouragement, either from the media or 
from the White House. Even though Jackson stated that it 
was to be a strictly humanitarian, moral mission, the media 
and others ridiculed it as a plot to help his upcoming 
campaign for the presidential nomination. Jackson likewise 
received absolutely no sympathy from the White House as 
President Reagan refused to answer his repeated phone 
calls.57
After negotiations with President Assad, Jackson 
successfully won the release of Lt. Goodman. When Jackson 
returned with him to the U.S. on January 4, 1984, first 
stopping at Andrews Air Force Base, there was a rousing 
welcome. Shortly thereafter, the two were invited to the 
White House for an 'official' welcome. The success of the
56 Lucius Barker, Our Time Has Come (Chicago: University
of Illinois Press, 1988), 57.
57 Ibid.
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mission, the publicity it generated and the credibility it 
bestowed upon Jackson would have been the envy of any 
politician. As Senator Edward Kennedy put it: "Surely ... 
this personal initiative by Reverend Jackson will rank as 
one of the finest achievements by a private citizen in the 
history of international relations."58
In June 1988, Jackson would once again try to secure 
the freedom of American hostages in the Middle East. On 
June 29 Jackson announced an initiative aimed at freeing 
nine Americans believed to be being held captive in Lebanon. 
Jackson asserted the need to keep the "plight of the 
American hostages high up on our consciences, and to reach 
out to elements and allies in the region to negotiate their 
release. "59
One month later it became obvious just which element 
Jackson would be reaching out to in the Middle East.
Jackson tried to arrange a meeting between himself and Ali 
Akbar Velayati, the Foreign Minister of Iran. At this 
meeting Jackson wanted to open discussions on securing the 
release of the American hostages.60 He felt Velayati 
could be instrumental because it was widely believed that 
the nine American hostages were being held by Islamic
58 Ibid., 59.
59 Karen Tumulty, "Jackson Tells Plan to Free U.S. 
Hostages in Lebanon," Los Angeles Times, 30 June 1988.
60 Robert Pear, "Jackson is Seeking Talk With Iranian to 
Free Hostages," New York Times, 28 July 1988.
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fundamentalists who received both money and guidance from 
Iran.
Once again, Jackson got little support from the White 
House. White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater stated that 
President Bush's position was that "official channels are 
the place to conduct foreign policy."61 Sheila Tate, the 
press secretary for George Bush when he was Vice President, 
said that Bush continued to see Jackson as a "loose cannon" 
who could endanger American foreign policy interests.62
Unlike his previous success negotiating for the release 
of Lt. Goodman, Jesse Jackson was unable to secure the 
freedom of the nine hostages in Lebanon as he was never able 
to arrange a meeting with Velayati. Despite this failure, 
Jackson was willing once again to jump into the spotlight by 
attempting to get hostages freed when the Persian Gulf 
Crisis erupted in the latter half of 1990.
In August of 1990, Jesse Jackson announced plans to 
make a trip to Iraq. He was to travel as a journalist 
representing his new television program. Jackson stated 
that there was pressure applied from "high levels" of the 
U.S. Government to discourage his trip to interview the 
leader of Iraq, Saddam Hussein.63 On August 30, the
61 E.J. Dionne, Jr., "Views Split on Jackson Hostage 
Offer," New York Times, 30 July 1988.
62 Ibid.
63 Gwen Ifill, "Jackson Plans Trip To Iraq despite 'Some 
Pressure' from U . S Washington Post, 22 August 1990.
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official Iraqi News Agency reported that Jackson met with 
President Saddam Hussein to discuss the Persian Gulf 
Crisis.64
While in Iraq, Jesse Jackson, also met with Americans 
and other Westerners being held at strategic military and 
civilian installations. After discussions with Saddam 
Hussein, as well as "continuous negotiations in Kuwait," 
Jackson secured the release of many Westerners being held 
captive. Along with the several hundred women and children 
Saddam Hussein was permitting to leave, Jackson negotiated 
for the additional release of many male captives who were 
sick.65 Even though Jackson was unable to obtain 
administrative approval for his mission, he at least 
received the gratitude of those whom he helped to freedom. 
One of the sick hostages, upon his return to the United 
States, stated that he was free "by the grace of God and 
Jesse Jackson."66 It should be noted, however, that Saddam 
Hussein also had a lot to gain by allowing the hostages to 
leave because, such an action, could improve the opinion 
that the nations of the world had of him.
64 "Jesse Jackson Meets Hussein On Gulf Crisis, Iraq 
Reports," New York Times, 31 August 1990.
65 Mark Fineman, "Women, Children Airlifted to Freedom 
from Iraq," Washington Post, 2 September 1990.
66 Walter Goodman, "Jackson on Assignment in Iraq: 
Reporter Becomes the Story," New York Times, 5 September 1990
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Although Saddam Hussein benefitted from allowing the 
hostages to leave, Jesse Jackson also benefitted because he 
had once again found the spotlight in a hostage mission.
Once again he was able to negotiate with a leader of a 
nation in the Middle East and help secure the release of 
hostages. Jesse Jackson has at times proven to be 
successful in endeavors aimed at securing the release of 
hostages, with little help from official Washington, when 
other "official” diplomatic channels have proven fruitless.
JESSE JACKSON'S CRITIQUE OF U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY:
In the 1984 campaign for the Democratic presidential 
nomination, one of Jackson's greatest accomplishments was 
his ability to raise unpopular policy issues and to discuss 
national priorities. Among these unpopular issues and 
national priorities were the rights of Palestinians and the 
need for an "evenhanded" policy in the Middle East.67 When 
Jackson was able to place Middle East issues on the campaign 
agenda, it was evident that he was very critical of American 
Middle East policy.
Jackson's position concerning U.S. foreign policy in 
his 1984 campaign was that it was both "inadequate and 
reprehensible."68 This inadequacy and reprehensibility was
67 Patricia Gurin, Shirley Hatchett and James Jackson, 
Hope and Independence (New York: Russell Sage Foundation,
1989) 164-166.
68 Barker and Walters, 155.
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nowhere as apparent, according to Jackson, as it was 
concerning the Middle East. The Middle East plank of the 
Jesse Jackson platform was the most divergent of his 
positions from the plank supported by the Democratic Party. 
The following chart provides a brief, but incomplete, 
illustration:
-Jackson plank-
1. Called for the creation 
of a Palestinian homeland
2. Called for readjustment of 
relationships in the Middle 
East to more "balanced" 
proportions
3. Supported the security of 
Israel within inter­
nationally recognized 
boundaries
As this chart shows, Jesse Jackson was against a U.S. 
Middle East policy that considered Israeli interests 
exclusively; he was more attuned to Arab interests and 
grievances than was the Democratic Party. He supported a 
more balanced, equitable approach to U.S. foreign policy in 
the Middle East, an approach which "acknowledged the 
legitimacy of interests other than Israel's."70 In fact, 
Jackson "boldly advocated a Middle East policy that would 
include the entire region, considering the interests of both 
Israel and her Arab neighbors."71
-Democratic plank-
1. Called for a resolution of 
the Palestinian issue
2. Supported the principle of 
of peace in the area 
centered around continued 
strong U.S. support of 
Israel
3. Supported the existence 
of Israel with secure 
and defensible borders69
69 Ibid.
70 Reed, 101.
71 Barker, 104.
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Aside from Jackson's concern for a more "balanced” 
Middle East policy, he was also very critical of unilateral 
action taken by the United States in the region. When 
Jackson proposed an international peace conference on the 
Middle East in March 1987, he expressly stated that 
"(u)nilateral action by the United States is not the key to 
peace in the region."72 Rather, he saw, and continues to 
see, the need for cooperation by the international 
community.
When Iran Air Flight 655 was shot down over the Persian 
Gulf in July 1988 by an American warship, Jackson was once 
again very critical of unilateral action. Jackson argued 
that there was no evidence that the U.S. ship was under 
attack by the Iranian jet. He also stated that the blame 
for the incident, which killed hundreds of Iranian 
civilians, did not rest on failed technology, but rather on 
a "failed and vague policy for the region."73 Jackson 
argued that the United States should not have been in the 
region unilaterally; the U.S. should only have been in the 
Middle East as one part of a multilateral United Nations 
peacekeeping effort which would have as its prime objective 
a negotiated settlement of the Iran-Iraq war.74
72 Dickenson, my emphasis.
73 Robin Toner, "Candidates for President Express 
Differing Views on Downing of Jet," New York Times, 5 July
1988.
74 Ibid.
Jackson was overtly critical of unilateral action by 
the United States in the Middle East, stating the 
detrimental effect it had, particularly with regard to any 
future U.S. action in the region. When the Persian Gulf 
Crisis erupted in 1990, Jackson once again was openly 
critical of U.S. action; Jackson was highly critical of the 
Bush Administration for not working harder to free the 
Western hostages being held captive in Iraq and occupied 
Kuwait. Although Jackson was implicitly critical of the 
Iraqi government, he was overtly critical of the U.S. 
government for not working harder to find "common ground," a 
peaceful solution to the problem.75 He stated that it was 
"time for the congressmen, senators and leaders in other 
countries to work through diplomacy instead of beating the 
drums of war."76
It should be noted, however, that although Jackson was 
always urging the Bush Administration to work through 
diplomatic channels to solve the Persian Gulf Crisis, he was 
also supportive of military action in the region if 
necessary "to secure an end to the military aggression by 
Iraq."77 Jackson said of Saddam Hussein: "He must know he 
has pushed us over the line and that his insistence on the
75 Goodman.
76 Fineman.
77 "Jackson Urges U.S. Diplomacy," New York Times, 4 
August 1990.
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occupation of Kuwait and the threat against Saudi Arabia is 
an extreme act of provocation that would be met with 
force. "78
In fact, the same Jesse Jackson, who was previously 
highly skeptical of and dead set against unilateral action 
of any form by the United States in the Middle East, changed 
his tune during the Persian Gulf Crisis. Jackson stated 
that the United States had to drive Saddam Hussein and the 
Iraqi forces "back to the borders." He also said that the 
U.S. had to be prepared to "use military force, 
multilaterally or unilaterally."79 Although he obviously 
preferred the multilateral use of force, Jesse Jackson was 
not against the use of force unilaterally by the United 
States if it was necessary.80
This inconsistency in his Middle East perspective can 
be attributed to Jackson's concern for human rights.
Jackson believed that Saddam Hussein and his Iraqi forces 
had taken away the human rights of the Kuwaiti peoples; he 
felt that if unilateral military action by the United States 
was needed to restore the Kuwaitis' human rights, then so be 
it. By his numerous arguments for such unilateral action
78 Ibid.
79 E.J. Dionne, Jr., "Post-Cold War Consensus backs U.S. 
Intervention," Washington Post, 8 August 1990? my emphasis.
80 New York Times, 4 August 1990.
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during the Persian Gulf Crisis, Jackson clearly showed that 
his concern is, first and foremost, for human rights.
In the column that Jesse Jackson writes for the Los 
Angeles Times, he showed support for the Bush Administration 
by stating that it had acted correctly during the Persian 
Gulf Crisis. He stated that "Bush's actions have been 
prudent, skillful and in proportion. In other words, he has 
been fundamentally right.1 Yet Jackson was also quick to 
point out that "[i]n the final analysis, might may be used 
as a deterrent from aggression, but right must be the 
justification for acting. Bush is weakened by inconsistency 
in the application of these principles."81
According to Jackson:
Hussein was wrong when he violated Kuwait's right to 
self-determination and broke international law by 
invading a sovereign country. He is right, however, and 
gets a strong hearing in the Arab world, when he says 
that Israel is wrong for occupying the West Bank and 
Gaza and denying Palestinians their human rights and 
self-determination.
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia should not ignore the 
message (even though the messenger may be flawed) from 
many of their fellow Arabs about the grave disparity 
between the rich Persian Gulf states and the masses of 
poor in the region.
The United States should practice the democratic 
principles it preaches, even as it backs them up with 
economic and military strength. Then, we must act, we 
will have the moral authority to gain the backing of the 
world community because we are right, and not just 
because we have might.82
81 Jesse Jackson, "Use Might in Service of Right," Los
Angeles Times, 19 August 1990.
82 Ibid.
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Following the success the United States enjoyed in 
handling the Persian Gulf Crisis, Jackson was proud of the 
armed services. But he also criticized the United States 
government. He stated that even though the United States 
had spent billions of dollars fighting the war in the 
Persian Gulf, it had not been able to secure peace and 
stability in the Middle East.83 For Jackson, this 
represented a failure for the United States. The U.S. 
forces had been successful in driving the Iraqi forces out 
of Kuwait, but this represented merely putting a band aid on 
a cut that required stitches - it may have stopped the 
bleeding temporarily, but sooner or later the bleeding will 
continue. The Persian Gulf Crisis, in Jackson's opinion, 
was symptomatic of the real problems of the Middle East, the 
absence of stability and the lack of peace, and the U.S. had 
not been able to cure the disease simply by alleviating one 
of the symptoms.
Jackson has often taken the opportunity to voice 
criticism of U.S. foreign policy with regard to the Middle 
East. His criticisms have centered around the fact that the 
U.S. policy is not "balanced" and needs to include the 
interests of the entire region rather than merely the 
interests of Israel. He has also been critical of 
unilateral action taken by the United States in the Middle
83 Robert Boyd, "Jackson Brings Democrats' Divisions Out 
Into The Open," Philadelphia Inquirer, 9 June 1991.
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East, only breaking from this systematic opposition to 
unilateral action during the Persian Gulf Crisis. Jesse 
Jackson is, and has been, highly critical of U.S. Middle 
East policy because of its inherent contradictions which 
have severely limited the ability of the United States to 
take a further role in the region.
CONCLUSION:
Jesse Jackson's Middle East policy positions can be 
attributed to his strong devotion to human rights as well as 
the need to further human fulfillment and human well-being. 
This devotion is evidenced by the causes of his problems 
with the American Jewish community, his views concerning the 
Palestinians, his attempts to release hostages from their 
Middle East captors and the views he expressed concerning 
the Persian Gulf Crisis. Jesse Jackson's view is that U.S. 
Middle East policy needs to be balanced and consistent and 
work to secure the rights of all. He feels the same 
concerning U.S. Central America policy.
Ill
CENTRAL AMERICA
INTRODUCTION:
Jesse Jackson has never been at a loss of words or 
ideas concerning Central America and American policy towards 
that region. He has been successful at getting issues from 
that region placed upon the agenda in his 1984 and 1988 
campaigns to secure the Democratic presidential nomination 
and has taken every opportunity to discuss Central American 
issues in the media. This section will examine three 
factors which lead to an understanding of Jesse Jackson's 
Central America policy: 1) his views concerning the 
situation in Nicaragua; 2) his humanitarian actions taken in 
the region; and 3) his evaluation of U.S. Central America 
policy.
JESSE JACKSON AND THE SITUATION IN NICARAGUA:
Of all of the countries and occurrences in Central 
America, Jesse Jackson has given the situation in Nicaragua 
the most attention in his speeches and writings. To
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comprehend fully Jackson's views concerning Nicaragua, one 
needs to examine briefly what constitutes the 'situation' in 
that country. On July 19, 1979, the Somoza dictatorship was 
overthrown by the Sandinist Front of National Liberation.
The Somoza regime fell to the "determined guerilla operation 
backed by a united civilian population."84 The Sandinist 
Front of National Liberation (FSLN) became the first social 
revolutionary government in Central America since the ascent 
of Fidel Castro in Cuba.
Some of the followers of the Somoza regime have refused 
to accept or acknowledge the legitimacy of the Sandinist 
government. These people, known en masse as the Contras, 
have persistently launched attacks against the Sandinist 
government and its citizens from strongholds in places such 
as Honduras and Costa Rica. Fighting between the 
Sandinistas and the Contras has been one of the major 
defining characteristics of the Nicaraguan experience over 
the past decade.
The Somoza regime, when in power, had cultivated a 
'friendship' with the United States and the foreign policy 
stances it took were obsequiously 'pro-American.' When the 
War of Liberation ended causing the demise of the Somoza 
dictatorship and the coming to power of the FSLN, the social 
configuration of political power in Nicaragua changed
84 Thomas W. Walker, Nicaragua in Revolution (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1982), 81.
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abruptly. Unlike the Somozas, who had based their power in 
a corrupt, foreign-trained military establishment and a 
small economic elite, the Sandinistas drew their strength 
and their revolutionary mandate from the mass of the 
people.85
No longer was the Nicaraguan government strongly tied 
to the U.S. government; the Sandinistas did not need to 
cultivate the friendship of the United States because they 
did not rely on Washington to stay in power; they possessed 
the backing and support of the masses. Nicaragua no longer 
needed to follow the American lead; its foreign policy no 
longer had to be, and was not, obsequiously 'pro- 
American. ,86 In fact, when Nicaragua adopted a nonaligned 
foreign policy, its foreign policy came into conflict with 
U.S. foreign policy on such issues as Afghanistan and 
Cuba.87
When Ronald Reagan became president, the U.S. began to 
send aid to the Contra forces as they fought to overthrow 
the Sandinist government. Such things as Nicaragua's 
socialist form of government and its close ties to Cuba, 
coupled with Reagan's fear of the spread of communism, led 
the Reagan Administration to feel at odds with the FSLN and 
to support the Contras. At a rally in Washington D.C. in
85 Ibid., 17-20.
86 Ibid., 20-21.
87 Ibid., •
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early December 1983, Jackson stated that it was "in so many 
ways a dark hour" for the United States as its President was 
"embracing a movement to overthrow a government in 
Nicaragua; a legitimate government in Nicaragua.1188 
Jackson sees the Ortega regime, the Sandinist government, as 
a legitimate government because it symbolizes an expression 
of the popular will because the regime came about due to a 
revolution which had a wide base of support in the 
Nicaraguan population.
The reasons that Jackson felt the Reagan 
Administration's stances towards Nicaragua created such a 
'dark hour' for the U.S. came out clearly in a speech he 
presented at the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico in 
Mexico City on May 28, 1984. Jackson criticized the 
government for supporting and financially backing the "hated 
Somoza contras" to aid in their attempt to overthrow the 
Nicaraguan government and for planting mines in the harbors 
of Nicaragua.89 In the address he gave to the Democratic 
National Convention in 1984, Jackson stated similar 
sentiments arguing that the U.S. was "at its worst" when it 
was dealing with the occurrences in Nicaragua.90 According
88 Harrison Donnelly, "The Jackson Mystique: Emotion, 
Ambition," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 1 January, 
1984, 10, my emphasis.
89 Jesse Jackson, Straight From The Heart (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1987), 247.
90 Barker, 221.
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to Jackson, Reagan had it all wrong. The problems of 
Central America in general, and Nicaragua specifically, were 
poverty and disease, not communism.91
In an interview in the June 1984 issue of Playboy
magazine, Jesse Jackson provided advice to the Reagan
Administration on how to deal with Nicaragua. He stated:
We should recognize Nicaragua, we should open up 
dialogue with its leaders, we should stop supporting the 
rebels1 military, because we're losing the war and 
losing prestige. We are losing that war and losing 
credibility throughout the Third World because we're 
engaging in that war. We ought to be more patient with 
Third World nations in their transitions for 
development.
... And we ought to help stabilize that government, 
help correct through diplomacy and trade the wrongs that 
are there and not disrupt the people of that government 
with an attempted military overthrow.92
Jesse Jackson continued to argue against American
involvement in Nicaragua in the following years. On March
17, 1988, Jackson publicly assailed the decision made by the
U.S. government to deploy troops to Honduras to help the
Contras. The Contras in Honduras had come under attack from
Sandinist forces, so the Reagan Administration decided to
send American troops to Honduras to back the Contra forces.
Jackson stated:
The sending of troops to Honduras is not necessary. 
Honduras is not threatened by the alleged Nicaraguan 
raids made in hot pursuit. It appears the 
administration is once again trying to divert attention 
from a scandal (the Iran-Contra affair) using the
91 Faw and Skelton, 177.
92 uPlayboy Interview: Jesse Jackson,” Playboy, June 1984,
7 6 .
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military expedition to shift focus. These 
expeditions have been going on for 19 days. Why is it 
only now that we respond?93
Jackson clearly advocated a "cessation of hostilities
against a Communist Nicaragua"94 stating that the money the
Reagan Administration spent funding the Contras should have
been spent trying to alleviate the problems of poverty and
ignorance prevalent in Central America and elsewhere.95
In the speech he presented to the 1988 Democratic 
National Convention, much like the one he gave at the DNC 
four years earlier, Jackson again specifically called for an 
end to the "illegal war on Nicaragua" and called, instead, 
for the U.S. to join "the regional peace process that offers 
dialogue and hope."96 Even when Jackson's presidential 
campaign ended in 1988, his condemnations of the U.S. 
involvement in Nicaragua continued. The condemnations 
continued because the Bush Administration, like the Reagan 
Administration before it, supported the Contra cause.
In an article he wrote for the Los Angeles Times on 
November 2, 1989, Jackson stated that the peace process for 
Nicaragua hinged upon the demobilization of the Contras. He
93 Paul Taylor, "Democratic Presidential Candidates Assail 
Troop Dispatch," Washington Post, 18 March 1988.
94 Landess and Quinn, 252.
95 Ron Harris, "Jackson to Talk with Officials in Mexico 
on Debt, Development," Los Angeles Times, 18 May 1988.
96 Jesse Jackson, "A Call to Common Ground," Black 
Scholar, January/February, 1989, 17.
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further stated that the United States was undermining that
process by continuing to supply aid and support to the
Contras. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega had attempted
to secure a truce, but Contra violence continued and Ortega
was forced to announce the resumption of fighting. Jackson
called for the U.S. government to get over its "mad
obsession with keeping the Contras in business" and to
convince the Contras to demobilize so as to stop the
bloodshed. He wrote:
As they (the Contras) step up the killings of their 
countrymen, the folly of this policy (supporting the 
Contras) becomes obvious. The Contras are implicating 
us in their violence and shameful actions every day. 
Congress must pull the plug on them, and the 
Administration must offer its full support to the 
Central American peace process.97
In March 1990, Jackson once again criticized the
American government for its involvement in Nicaragua.
However, this criticism included a new topic as Jackson
chastised the Bush Administration for helping to finance one
of the candidates in the Nicaraguan presidential elections.
Jackson's statement was:
During the decade of the 1980s, the United States spent 
billions to carry out the war in Central America.
Thirty thousand Nicaraguans lost their lives. We 
imposed economic sanctions until the economy was in 
shambles. We mined their harbors in violation of 
international law, then thumbed our nose at the World 
Court when its decision went against us. Finally, we 
openly financed the political campaign of Violeta 
Barrios de Chamorro.
97 Jesse Jackson, "Two Sides Can't See Peace Staring Them 
in the Face," Los Angeles Times, 2 November 1989.
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If a country we depended on - say, Japan - were to 
cut us off economically, finance terrorist attacks 
against us and fund one party in an election campaign, 
we would be outraged at the violation of international 
law and treaties. We would hardly call the elections 
free and fair.98
Jesse Jackson has been consistently opposed to the 
United States government's stances concerning Nicaragua 
since the 1979 revolution that brought the Sandinist 
government to power. This opposition has occurred on 
various levels. One level is that the aid that the Contras 
have received from America has helped to prolong the 
fighting and increased the death count, while simultaneously 
undermining any attempt at forging a peace between the two 
sides. On another level, Jackson condemned the economic 
sanctions placed upon the communist Nicaragua ruled by the 
Sandinist government, sanctions which crippled the 
Nicaraguan economy and harmed many people.
On a third level, Jackson criticized the initial U.S. 
decision to violate international law by mining the harbors 
of Nicaragua as well as the U.S. decision to compound the 
wrong by ignoring the World Court ruling when it found the 
United States guilty of violating international law.
Jackson, on yet another level, opposed the U.S. involvement 
and intervention in the Nicaraguan elections.
Each of these levels of opposition and criticism can be 
traced back to a similar root - Jesse Jackson's devotion to
98 Jesse Jackson, "Selling the Human Spirit," Los Angeles 
Times, 2 March 1990.
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the concept of self-determination. Not unlike his arguments 
for the need to give Palestinians the right to self- 
determination in the Middle East, Jackson views the 
Sandinist government as the expression of the preference 
that the Nicaraguan people have as to what type of 
government they wish to live under, an aspect of their right 
to self-determination. The Nicaraguan people have expressed 
their right to self-determination, but the United States, 
through its policy concerning Nicaragua, has tried to 
undermine and take away that right because Nicaragua has 
chosen to implement a system of government which is not 
'democratic' in the American sense of the word. In 
Jackson's view, supporting anti-government rebels in 
Nicaragua represents denying that country its right to self- 
determination .
JESSE JACKSON AT WORK IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
At various times Jesse Jackson has taken an active role 
in Central American affairs and has often made humanitarian 
appeals concerning events in the region. He has tried to 
help the cause of Haitian refugees and peasant laborers in 
Mexico. He has worked to secure the freedom of hostages and 
has visited the sites of natural disasters to comfort those 
displaced by the forces of nature.
As part of an essay Jackson wrote for Universal Press 
in 1982, he criticized the American treatment of Haitian
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refugees. He wrote that "American military ships, under 
executive order, roam the high seas to intercept boats 
carrying Haitian refugees seeking political asylum and to 
turn them away from our shores without due process - a 
violation of human rights."99 He went on to state that 
those Haitians who did reach the United States "(we)re held 
in what amount to criminal detention centers without 
criminal charges - another violation of human rights."100
What infuriated Jackson was that, while the Haitian 
refugees were being treated so harshly, Polish dissidents 
and diplomats were being welcomed into America as political 
refugees seeking asylum. Besides the inhumane treatment 
accorded to the Haitians, Jackson opposed the hypocrisy of 
United States policy. Such a double standard for measuring 
human rights, according to Jackson, decreased the moral 
authority possessed by the United States and hindered its 
ability to influence world public opinion.101
When natural disasters occurred, ravaging portions of 
Central America, Jesse Jackson often visited the devastated 
regions. Such visits were intended to let the people know 
that others cared. When Hurricane Gilbert hit Jamaica in 
September 1988 leaving thousands of Jamaicans without food,
99 Jackson, Straight From The Heart. 74,
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
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shelter or work, Jackson travelled there to view the 
damage.102
Jackson told the Jamaicans:
We're here because we care. We're here to let people 
know that just because they're homeless they need not be 
hopeless. They're not helpless because they have 
friends.103
Besides trying to ease the pain and hardship caused by 
Gilbert, Jackson also hoped to bring the plight of the 
Jamaicans into world view. He stated that he and the other 
American dignitaries would try to mobilize the conscience of 
people around the world so that the Jamaican people could 
get the supplies they needed to repair the damage caused by 
the hurricane.104
When Hurricane Hugo hit the Caribbean, Jackson the
'humanitarian' once again travelled to the ravaged region.
Much like his purpose thirteen months earlier in Jamaica,
Jackson wanted to let the peoples of the Caribbean know that
other people cared, as well as hoping to place the plight of
the Caribbeans before a world-wide audience. Jackson's
message this time included the fact that some positive
things could come out of the disaster. He stated:
The flip side of the destruction caused by Hurricane 
Hugo is opportunity. ... Now we need to seize the
102 "Jackson Views Jamaica Damage," Los Angeles Times, 19 
September 1988.
103 Joseph Treaster, "Jackson Visits Homeless Jamaicans," 
New York Times, 19 September 1988.
104 Ibid.
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moment and begin to rebuild these homes, schools and 
hospitals. The youths who live on these islands need to 
be trained to become brick masons, glazers, roofers and 
plumbers.105
In the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo, Jackson saw the 
opportunity to train the victims in the skills needed to 
rebuild their homes, their communities.
Jesse Jackson, aside from comforting those harmed by 
natural disasters, also worked to secure the freedom of 
prisoners being held captive in Cuba. Much as he had for 
Lieutenant Goodman in Syria and numerous individuals in 
Iraq, Jackson tried to get into the spotlight by working to 
get people freed from their captivity.
In June 1984 Jesse Jackson had various discussions with 
Fidel Castro. In an eight hour meeting between the two men 
held at the Palace of the Revolution, Jackson was able to 
secure the release of twenty-two Americans being held in 
Cuban jails.106 He was also able to secure the release of 
twenty-six Cuban political prisoners.107 In one brief trek 
to Cuba, Jackson was able to secure the freedom of forty- 
eight people being held in prison. While Jackson was able 
to get publicity, Castro also gained from the prisoner 
release. He "got rid of some people he didn't need in
105 D. Michael Cheers, "Train Caribbean Victims in Skills 
Needed to Rebuild Their Homes, Jackson Says," Jet, 23 October
1989.
106 Faw and Skelton, 182.
107 Barker and Walters, 122.
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return for some declarations that couldn't be enforced,"108 
declarations in the form of a ten-point statement issued by 
both Castro and Jackson.
Jesse Jackson has also argued for the cause of peasant
laborers in Mexico. In April 1991 he wrote an article for
the Los Angeles Times in which he vehemently argued against
a free-trade agreement between the United States and Mexico.
He wrote that the free-trade zone would be disastrous for
Mexican workers because:
U.S. and Japanese multinational companies would move to 
Mexico to avoid tougher U.S. environmental, health and 
safety, and minimum-wage laws.
This is not a false alarm. It is already happening 
in Mexico's border export zone, where foreign 
corporations pay Mexican workers about 60 cents an hour. 
A flood of U.S. firms have moved to the Mexican side to 
escape our labor and environmental laws.
... Corporate pressure keeps wage rates in the 
export-zone plants lower than in the rest of Mexico. We 
export jobs and import goods made with poisons we have 
banned, by labor paid less than we allow, working in 
conditions beneath what we accept. Mexico gets jobs 
without hope, a poisoned environment, an impoverished 
work force eager to come this way.109
Jackson feels it is necessary to raise the standards for the
Mexican workers and not to lower those of the United States.
Jackson agrees with Cuahtemoc Cardenas, the Mexican 
presidential candidate who was 'robbed' in the 1988 
election, that the United States and Mexico need to forge a 
social compact. The goal of the compact would be to grant
108 Faw and Skelton, 184.
109 Jesse Jackson, "Free Trade: a Fast One on the Fast 
Track," Los Angeles Times, 15 April 1991.
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Mexican people minimum wages, health and safety guarantees, 
environmental and consumer protection and child—labor 
restrictions comparable with those enjoyed by the citizens 
of the United States. The U.S. role in the compact would be 
to help Mexico help its workers by fulfilling the 
aforementioned goals? the U.S. would use inducements in the 
form of 'substantial debt relief.' The debt relief provided 
to Mexico by the United States would allow both countries to 
grow together.110
Jesse Jackson has often answered the calls of the needy 
in Central America: he has secured the freedom of prisoners, 
he has gone to bat for Mexican laborers and Haitian refugees 
and he has brought the plight of victims of natural 
disasters into the public eye. Jackson has been devoted to 
helping the poor, the needy, the unrepresented, the 
dispossessed? he has consistently fought to give all people 
the rights they deserve.
JESSE JACKSON'S EVALUATION OF U.S. CENTRAL AMERICA POLICY:
In the 1984 and 1988 campaigns for the Democratic 
presidential nomination, one of Jesse Jackson's greatest 
accomplishments was his ability to raise unpopular issues 
and to discuss national priorities. Among these unpopular 
issues and national priorities were the wars being fought in 
Central America and relations between the United States and
110 Ibid.
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Cuba. When Jackson was able to place Central American 
issues on the agenda, it was evident that he was very 
critical of American Central America policy.
Jackson*s position concerning U.S. foreign policy in 
the 1984 campaign was that it was both "inadequate and 
reprehensible."111 This inadequacy and reprehensibility 
was, according to Jackson, very apparent concerning the U.S. 
government's positions in Central America. He placed blame 
on the Reagan Administration and Ronald Reagan specifically 
stating:
President Reagan would have the people of the United 
States believe that the struggle in Central America and 
Latin America is a struggle between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. He would convince our people that 
this is a life-and-death struggle between the forces of 
light and the forces of darkness - that all those who 
love freedom must be willing to commit endless military 
and financial resources to the government of El 
Salvador, to turning Honduras into an American military 
base, to financing the contras seeking to overthrow the 
government of Nicaragua. He seeks to make the 
isolation of Cuba one of the chief goals of United 
States Central America policy.112
Whereas Reagan saw Central America as a playing field 
for competition between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., Jackson saw 
the region as an area with various problems such as disease, 
poverty and human rights violations, problems which American 
policy was contributing to rather than helping. In fact, no 
issue better illustrated the distinction between Jackson and 
his opponents in 1984 than Central America. Rather
111 Gurin, et. al, 164-166.
112 Jackson, Straight From The Heart. 247.
53
... than condemning the liberation movements in the 
region, Rev. Jackson effectively argued that such 
movements were the inevitable result of oppression and 
exploitation and that the United States had historically 
far too often consciously supported its 
perpetrators.113
One specific issue which Jesse Jackson often criticized 
was the stance that the United States has taken towards 
Cuba. There is no other country in the hemisphere, no other 
leader, about which American perceptions are so influenced 
by myth, stereotype and unabashed propaganda as Cuba and 
Fidel Castro. Americans know pitifully little about this 
island nation, its people and its leader. Jackson was, and 
is, convinced that propaganda is not the kind of element 
upon which the United States foreign policy should be based. 
When Jackson made his much publicized trip to Central 
America during his 1984 campaign, Cuba was included as one 
of his stops.114
One of the themes of Jackson's visit to Cuba, as well 
as his meetings with Fidel Castro, was that "all of the 
presidential administrations of the past thirty years, 
Democratic as well as Republican, had failed in their 
management of foreign policy because they had neglected to 
make the simplest sort of overture to a benign and misjudged 
man (Castro)"115 When Jackson secured the release of the
113 Barker and Walters, 115.
114 Ibid.
115 Landess and Quinn, 229.
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Cuban prisoners on that trip, he stated that the prisoner 
release was a sign from Castro that he wanted to normalize 
relations with the United States.116
During that visit, Jackson and Castro signed a ten- 
point statement, a document which Jackson labelled as 
"historic.11 Part of the document stated that "the Cuban 
government would consider letting some of the so-called 
Cuban boat-people who had illegally emigrated to the United 
States - and who are now sitting in Florida jails - come 
back to Cuba."117 The document also included the fact that 
Cuba was willing to consider exchanging ambassadors with 
Washington.
Jackson has consistently criticized the fact that, 
despite such overtures by the Cuban government and Fidel 
Castro to normalize relations between the two nations, the 
U.S. government has chosen to view Cuba as an enemy, a 
communist threat perched on the back porch of Florida.
Jesse Jackson has argued for the normalization of relations 
between the United States and Cuba, relations which need to 
include both diplomatic ties and trade.118
Aside from his condemnation of the official U.S. stance 
towards Cuba, Jackson also has been highly critical of 
American policy concerning El Salvador. In the early part
116 Faw and Skelton, 182.
117 Ibid, 183.
118 Jackson, Straight From The Heart, 247.
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of the 198 0s, Jackson criticized the fact that taxes 
collected in the United States had gone to support the 
"repressive military junta" in El Salvador.119
According to Jackson, the U.S. government was wrong in 
its support of the Duarte regime in El Salvador. That 
support had been in the form of military aid which America 
had been providing to the Salvadoran forces against guerilla 
forces trying to overthrow President Duarte. Jackson felt 
that such aid served only to prolong the fighting between 
the Salvadoran government and the FDR-FMLN.120 Aside from 
the prolonged bloodshed brought about due to the American 
military aid, Jackson was also appalled because the aid was 
going to a regime which he considered to be repressive.121
Jackson has argued for the establishment of normal 
relations between the United States and Cuba, has criticized 
the aid given by America to the repressive Duarte regime in 
El Salvador and has opposed the support the U.S. government 
has provided to the contra forces trying to overthrow the 
Sandinist regime in Nicaragua. As stated previously,
Jackson viewed giving aid and support to the Contras as a 
violation of the Nicaraguan people's right to self- 
determination. Much of Jackson's criticisms center on the 
United States' military involvement in Central America.
119 Ibid.
120 Barker and Walters, 120.
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Thus, when the United States invaded Panama late in the 
1980s, Jackson was a critic of the decision.
Before the actual invasion of Panama by American forces 
sent to extradite Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega,
Jackson was opposed to the treatment the U.S. was according 
to Panama. The economic sanctions that America had placed 
on the country in an attempt to force Noriega out of power, 
according to Jackson, were "causing tremendous suffering 
among the common people of Panama."122 Jackson stated that 
the "common people are being starved, the common people are 
going without medicine, are in great anguish and pain, and 
Noriega is insulated by his wealth and his military."123 
Jackson argued for the United States and its allies to send 
humanitarian aid to Panama through the Red Cross.124
Jackson was critical of the decision to impose economic 
sanctions against Panama, but what added to his anger was 
the hypocrisy of the U.S. For a long time General Noriega 
was 'in bed' with the United States government.
According to Jackson: "(t)o be sure, our CIA was involved 
with Noriega for a long time. We've known of his dealings 
in drugs and guns for a long time."125 He questioned,
122 Richard Berke, "Jackson Urges Noriega to Quit," New 
York Times, 5 April 1988.
123 Robert Gillette, "Jackson Asks Aid for Panamanians," 
Los Angeles Times, 5 April 1988.
124 Berke.
125 Gillette.
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also, the relationship between Noriega and American 
officials which played a role in providing arms to the 
Contras circumventing bans imposed on such activity by 
Congress.
Once the U.S. had invaded Panama and Noriega was 
seeking refuge in the Vatican compound, Jackson still 
remained critical of the action. In fact, he titled an 
article he wrote concerning the Panamanian invasion for the 
Los Angeles Times on December 28, 1989: "In Moral Terms, A 
Stunning Defeat." In the article Jackson reiterated the 
fact that Noriega was once on the U.S. payroll, but he fell 
out of favor and became America's 'arch-enemy.1
Jackson was critical of the loss of human life due to 
the Panamanian invasion as twenty-three American soldiers 
lost their lives and three hundred and thirty others were 
wounded. Two hundred and ninety-seven Panamanian soldiers 
lost their lives in the altercation as well as hundreds of 
Panamanian civilians.126
Of the invasion Jackson wrote:
The loss of America's moral authority has been great. 
Most nations in the world, including our allies, have 
condemned our intervention as a violation of 
international law and national sovereignty.
... we have undermined the global movement toward 
peaceful democratic change and respect for the rule of 
law. We have revived a long history of imperial 
interference in Central America.127
126 Jesse Jackson, "In Moral Terms, A Stunning Defeat,"
Los Angeles Times, 28 December 1989.
127 Ibid.
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A week later, Jackson once again authored an article 
criticizing the Panamanian invasion. This time, he 
condemned the action as immoral because the United States 
was militarily occupying a sovereign state and had killed 
hundreds of innocent people when our forces bombed densely 
populated civilian areas. He also chastised the media for 
not discussing the five other American interventions in 
Panama in the 20th Century.128
Jesse Jackson has often taken the opportunity to voice 
criticism of U.S. foreign policy with regard to Central 
America. However, he has also gone to great lengths to 
articulate plans to solve the crises of instability and 
fighting which are at the root of the problems in Central 
America. Jesse Jackson has six goals for American foreign 
policy in Central America. Those goals are:
1) To end the war waged on Nicaragua so that the U.S. 
could help the country build a more just society, 
develop democratic institutions and develop health and 
literacy programs.
2) To dismantle the military complex in Honduras and to 
end American exercises there.
3) To start negotiations between the two sides of the 
conflict in El Salvador aimed at ending the violence 
and developing a government in which all parties can 
freely participate. To do this, the U.S. can no 
longer send military aid to the El Salvadoran 
government and must condition any future economic aid 
on whether or not the Duarte regime engages in serious 
negotiations with the FDR-FMLN. The negotiations must 
work toward peace through justice.
128 Jesse Jackson, "Watchdog Wasn't Leashed, It Was 
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4) To cut off all military assistance to the Guatemalan 
government because of its repressive policies toward 
its own people.
5) To support the masses in Costa Rica who have marched 
against the militarization of their country by contra 
forces supported by the United States. We must stop 
pressuring Costa Rica to give up its position of 
neutrality and must create a mutually beneficial 
relationship based upon trade.
6) To normalize relations with Cuba. We must recognize 
Cuba as a neighbor and not a communist threat. The 
U.S. needs to encourage trade and economic, cultural 
and social exchanges between the two countries.129
The policy which Jackson has sought for Central America 
is one aimed at promoting economic, cultural and social 
development in the region that would benefit all of the 
people and not just a handful of wealthy elites. He would 
like to see a narrowing of the gap between the rich and the 
poor in the region brought about by governments which are 
chosen by and supported by the people, whether communist or 
democratic, with help provided by the United States.
CONCLUSION:
Much like the foreign policy which Jesse Jackson argues 
for in the Middle East, his Central America foreign policy 
is rooted firmly in his devotion to human rights, human 
well-being and human fulfillment. This devotion is 
prevalent in his evaluation of U.S. involvement of 
Nicaragua, his missions to comfort those displaced by
129 Jackson, Straight From The Heart, 248-249.
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natural disasters and to release political prisoners as well 
as his criticisms of U.S. Central America foreign policy.
Jackson feels that the United States needs to withdraw 
its military forces and advisors from the region and work 
towards establishing a peace process. Rather than viewing 
Central America as a place where the United States must 
undermine communism, American foreign policy should be aimed 
at fighting the real problems in the region: poverty, 
disease and human rights violations. Jackson has similar 
views concerning U.S. foreign policy towards Africa.
XV
AFRICA
INTRODUCTION:
Jesse Jackson was the first viable African-American 
candidate for the office of President of the United States. 
Therefore, it should come as little surprise that he has 
kept a keen eye on U.S. foreign policy concerning Africa, 
the continent from which his ancestors came. Jackson has 
made Africa an issue which received attention in his 1984 
and 1988 campaigns. This section will examine four factors 
which will lead to an understanding of the foreign policy he 
espouses for Africa: 1) his evaluation of the situation in 
South Africa; 2) his advocation of both American trade and
American aid for the nations of Africa? 3) his views
concerning Liberia? and 4) his evaluation of U.S. Africa 
policy.
JESSE JACKSON ON SOUTH AFRICA:
Long before Jesse Jackson launched his campaign for the
Democratic presidential nomination of 1984, he openly
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criticized the apartheid system in South Africa. In 
September 1979, after he made a seventeen-day visit to South 
Africa, Jackson testified before the U.S. House of 
Representatives Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on 
International Relations concerning apartheid. His testimony 
was a pointed indictment of American involvement in the 
country:
One could say, "Well, this is bad, and we oppose it, but 
what does this have to do with U.S. foreign policy?"
The U.S. involvement with that racist regime - the 
economic, political, diplomatic, military, and cultural 
ties between our government and the apartheid regime of 
South Africa - constitutes a partnership of serious 
import.
The United States has official diplomatic relations 
with the South African government. This legal cover 
allows 350 U.S. business corporations to operate there. 
The highest returns in the world in foreign investment 
are in South Africa, and 15 to 17 percent of total U.S. 
foreign investment is there. ... These 350 U.S. 
corporations employ about 60,000 blacks - mostly in 
menial, low-paying jobs with no union - and another 
40,000 whites, mostly in upper-salary, white- 
collar occupations and managerial positions.
These circumstances put the U.S. government and our 
corporations in an uneasy partnership with South African 
apartheid. Sixty thousand black jobs and no union or 
citizenship rights cannot serve as a trade-off or a 
buffer for the quest for full and equal citizenship 
rights for 20 million black people in South Africa. The 
partnership between the United States and South Africa 
is an uneasy one because it represents the most blatant 
violation of President Carter's human rights policy.130
Jackson's testimony focused on the fact that such 
American involvement was immoral because of the way black 
South Africans were treated under the apartheid regime. He 
stated that blacks were not recognized legally or
130 Jackson, Straight From The Heart, 23 4.
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economically, they were classified as "untouchables" 
socially and labelled "an error" religiously. According to 
Jackson, apartheid represented a moral illegitimacy that all 
must fight.131
In July 1980 Jackson began to urge the imposition of 
economic sanctions against South Africa. He called for the 
U.S. to stop vetoing proposals made in the United Nations to 
implement such sanctions. Jackson suggested that America 
was in 'partnership' with the South African government; he 
criticized American companies for locating in and investing 
in South Africa, opposed the fact that the U.S. was selling 
military equipment to the apartheid regime and condemned the 
nuclear collaboration between the two countries. Jackson 
stated that "(s)uch action is immoral, it is economically 
unfeasible, it is politically dangerous, and it threatens 
our national interest."132
When Jesse Jackson made his presidential address at the 
annual convention of Operation PUSH (People United to Serve 
Humanity) one of the topics of his address was South Africa. 
He condemned the United States for having two sets of rules 
concerning democracy: "majority rule in America where whites 
are a majority and minority rule in South Africa where 
whites are a minority."133
131 Ibid., 239.
132 Ibid., 291.
133 Ibid., 50.
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Jackson went on to reaffirm PUSH'S stance concerning
South Africa. He stated:
(W)e stand unmoved and immovable in reiterating our 
unconditional stand on the question of human and 
political rights in South Africa. The issue is really 
very simple - one person, one vote, for our brothers and 
sisters in South Africa and immediate independence for 
Namibia.134
PUSH was against the fact that the South African government 
was maintaining colonial rule and influence over Namibia, 
refusing to grant that country its freedom.
In an essay he wrote for Universal Press on January 3, 
1982, Jesse Jackson criticized the Reagan Administration for 
its continuing relation with the South African government as 
well as its failure to impose economic sanctions against the 
country. Despite the continued violation of the human 
rights of black South Africans by the white minority, the 
U.S. government, according to Jackson, "has drawn closer to 
the South African government and expanded trade 
relations. "135
Jackson's condemnation of the 'partnership' between the 
Reagan Administration and the repressive, racist South 
African government persisted. What further infuriated 
Jackson was that by 1983, despite the flagrant racial
134 Ibid., 60.
135 Ibid., 75.
65
inequality present under the apartheid regime, the U.S. had 
become South Africa's "number-one trading partner."136
Jackson became a leading spokesman against apartheid. 
All across the United States he urged Americans to give up 
business dealings with South Africa. By hurting the 
apartheid regime financially, Jackson was sure that the 
government would have to change its racist attitudes. He 
led rallies in front of the South African consular offices 
in Chicago and New York and at the South African embassy in 
Washington, D.C. He also took part in anti-apartheid 
demonstrations in England and West Germany.137
As Jackson mounted his campaign to secure the
Democratic presidential nomination in 1984, he consistently
brought up South Africa and kept the issue on the agenda.
When Jackson was invited to speak at the United Nations by
the ambassadors to the U.N. from the African states on
January 27, 1984, he spoke on what he considered the
'crisis' in South Africa. He stated:
This is 1984. For the people of Namibia, 1984 means one 
hundred years of colonialism. For decades the U.N. has 
attempted to negotiate the independence of Namibia with 
the Republic of South Africa. Never before has the 
world come so close to achieving a solution as in 
Security Council Resolution 435. But the government of 
South Africa continues to place stumbling blocks on the 
road to Namibia's independence. The government of South 
Africa introduces conditions that must be solved prior 
to addressing Namibia's independence. The government of 
South Africa is delaying the independence of Namibia.
136 Ibid., 21.
137 Chaplick, 80.
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The United States must not find itself a party to South 
Africa's obstructionist plan. We must not find 
ourselves supporting a government that violates the 
basic principles of the U.N. charter.138
Jackson once again criticized the inhumanity, immorality and
injustice of apartheid as well as South Africa's failure to
give up its colonial rule over Namibia. He, likewise,
continued to condemn the U.S. for being 'a party to' the
process.
In a debate between the top three democratic 
presidential hopefuls on April 1, Jackson "came down hard 
for tougher sanctions against South Africa - and demanded 
that Mondale and Hart do likewise."139 One month later 
Jackson wrote an article in Africa Report which outlined the 
relationship that would exist between the United States and 
Africa if he were to become President. He stated that under 
a Jackson Administration the U.S. would no longer be an 
"active partner in maintaining the immoral apartheid system" 
and would work to eliminate the apartheid system in South 
Africa as well as trying to secure independence for 
Namibia.140
During the 1984 Democratic National Convention, Jesse 
Jackson worked hard to make his positions concerning U.S. 
and South Africa relations part of the Africa plank of the
138 Ibid., 227.
139 Faw and Skelton, 126.
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Democratic platform. Jackson was highly successful in 
achieving this goal, partly because his positions were those 
held by the vast majority of those present, as some of his 
specific proposals were adopted into the Democratic 
platform. Among the proposals were for America to:
1) exert maximum pressure on South Africa to hasten the 
establishment of a democratic unitary political 
system.
2) ban all new loans, sale or transfer of sophisticated 
computer and nuclear technology.
3) withdraw landing rights to South African aircraft.
4) progressively increase sanction against South Africa 
until it grants independence to Namibia.
At that same convention, when it came time for Jesse 
Jackson to make his address, he included a brief discussion 
of South Africa. He stated that, "at its worst, our Nation 
will have partnership with South Africa. That is a moral 
disgrace."141 The United States, however, relied heavily 
on South Africa for much-needed natural resources, thus the 
government was not easily willing to change its position 
toward the nation.
On January 15, 1986, at Ebenezer Baptist Church in 
Atlanta, Rev. Jackson again criticized the Reagan 
Administration for its continued relationship with the South 
African government and its president, F.W. de Klerk. In his 
sermon he argued that by "support(ing) state terrorism in 
South Africa,"142 the United States was losing its moral
141 Barker, 221.
142 Jackson, Straight From The Heart, 127.
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authority in the U.N., the Middle East, Central America and 
elsewhere.
In February 1988 the South African government detained 
many black religious leaders, among them Bishop Desmond 
Tutu, for leading demonstrations in Cape Town. Jesse 
Jackson was outraged at the "renewed arrogance and 
boldness"143 of the apartheid system and voiced this 
outrage in a thirty minute meeting he had with South African 
Ambassador Koorhof.
On March 16, Jackson accused his rivals for the 
Democratic presidential nomination of being passive in their 
disapproval of the South African government. He stated that 
"(t)he other candidates have taken a nonaggressive posture 
relative to South Africa. They must take a stand to end 
apartheid, not just be against it."144 Jackson's plan to 
end apartheid included the withdrawal of all American 
corporations from South Africa and removing South African 
forces from adjacent Namibia.145
As the Democratic National Convention drew near,
Jackson continued to assail his foes, particularly Michael 
Dukakis, for being too passive concerning the issue of South
143 Douglas Jehl, "Jackson Voices Protest with S. African 
Envoy," Los Angeles Times, 2 March 1988.
144 David Rosenbaum, "Jackson Assails Foes on South 
Africa," New York Times, 17 March 1988.
145 Robert Gillette, "Jackson Tells Plan to End 
Apartheid," Los Angeles Times, 10 April 1988.
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Africa. Jackson vowed that he would take the issue to the 
floor of the convention and fight it out until Dukakis 
agreed to declare South Africa a 'terrorist state,' a 
declaration which carries with it stiff economic and 
diplomatic sanctions.146
When Jesse Jackson addressed the Democratic National
Convention in 1988, his speech contained a message
concerning South Africa. His suggestions were much more
pointed this time, as opposed to the remarks he made at the
1984 DNC. He stated:
We must have freedom in South Africa. Enforce 
comprehensive sanctions against the terrorist state.
Get South Africa out of Angola, free Namibia, support 
the frontline states in their struggle against South 
African aggression.147
In December 1988 a nonaggression accord was signed 
between the de Klerk government and the South African 
guerrillas. The treaty provided for U.N. supervised 
elections in, and then independence, for Namibia. Yet, this 
was not the end of Jackson's criticism towards South Africa. 
In October 1989 Jackson told the United Nations Assembly, 
despite efforts to bar his speech undertaken by the 
governments of the United States, Britain and France, that a 
"reign of terror" existed in Namibia because the U.N. had 
allowed a climate of South African intimidation in the
146 Karen Tumulty, "Jackson Vows He'd Take Issue of South 
Africa to a Floor Fight," Los Angeles Times, 7 June 1988.
147 Jackson, Black Scholar, January/February 1989, 17.
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territory which gave South Africa the ability to influence 
Namibian elections.148
In an article Jackson wrote for the Los Angeles Times 
in January 1990, he raised the question of whether freedom 
from apartheid for black South Africans would be the next 
step in the process as democracy emerged from the shell of 
tyranny all over the Earth. He saw hope in the possibility, 
writing:
There is so much damage to be undone. The apartheid 
system has brutalized and degraded the black majority 
... (but) South Africa's isolation during the 1980s has 
helped turn around the thinking of its leaders, who now 
recognize that the course of democratic change is 
irresistible and inevitable.
... A new South Africa will be a place of hope, where 
those who have had the advantage see the light and those 
who have been kept down finally share in the bounty of 
the nation.
... It will rejoice in the splendor of all its 
peoples, their creativity, passion and brilliance. It 
will triumph not through violence and hatred but through 
peace and justice. Democracy will replace tyranny in 
South Africa and equality will take the place of 
domination.149
When President Frederick W. de Klerk announced that he 
was lifting restrictions on black nationalist groups,
Jackson responded with cautious optimism stating? "We've 
heard an emancipation proclamation speech, but the 
proclamation was the easy part. Now we want to see the
148 Ethan Schwartz, "Bid to Bar Jackson Speech Fails," 
Washington Post, 20 October 1989.
149 Jesse Jackson, "Will Freedom From Apartheid Be Next?" 
Los Angeles Times, 22 January 1990.
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emancipation."150 He was also quick to point out that it 
was much too early to lift the economic sanctions which the 
American government had finally levied against the South 
African government.
When Nelson Mandela was released from South African 
prison in February 1990 after twenty-seven years of 
detainment, Jackson was again cautiously optimistic. He 
stated that the release brought joy and hope, but simply 
because Mandela was free did not mean he was living in 
freedom. Jackson pointed out that even though Mandela was 
out of prison, he was still being treated like a second- 
class citizen, as all blacks were treated under apartheid.
He stated that Mandela could not vote, could not run for 
public office and did not possess any citizenship 
rights.151
Although Jackson applauded de Klerk for giving South 
Africa a much-needed 'face-lift' through the implementation 
of some reforms, he continued to condemn the apartheid 
regime because, in many ways, it was still up to its 'old 
tricks.' For example, while granting Namibia its political 
independence, South Africa retained economic and military
150 Glenn Frankel, "Jackson Cautious on S. Africa," 
Washington Post, 5 February 1990.
151 Jesse Jackson, "He Is Free But Not Living In Freedom," 
Los Angeles Times, 16 February 1990.
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influence in the country;152 the oppressive laws of
apartheid had not been lifted as the death count continued
to rise, the innocent remained languishing in dungeons and
people were detained without charges or trials.153
According to Jackson, the character of the apartheid system
had not changed because:
(t)he pillars of apartheid still stand - the laws that 
exclude blacks from voting, those that enforce 
segregation and racial exploitation, those that give the 
police emergency powers for brutal repression.154
Jackson had consistently condemned the oppressive 
apartheid system of South Africa and he also criticized the 
U.S. government for having ties to the government of that 
country. After the United States cut its ties and imposed 
economic sanctions on the de Klerk regime, Jackson argued 
for the U.S. to keep all sanctions in place until all 
aspects of the apartheid system were abandoned and all 
people, regardless of race, were treated equally and 
accorded the same rights.
JESSE JACKSON: ADVOCATE OF TRADE AND AID:
Jesse Jackson has consistently argued for American aid 
tc the needy individuals and nations of the African
152 Jesse Jackson, "Apartheid Regime Is Up To Its Old 
Tricks," Los Angeles Times, 30 March 1990.
153 Jesse Jackson, "No Rewards Before Real Change," Los 
Angeles Times, 3 June 1990.
154 Jesse Jackson, "Why Then Embrace De Klerk?" Los 
Angeles Times, 27 September 1990.
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continent as well as the expansion of trade between the U.S. 
and African nations. He has stated that America should 
provide aid to African nations and establish trading 
relations with African nations; neither trade nor aid, by 
itself, would be sufficient to establish a fair foreign 
policy towards Africa.
In 1974, as part of a movement undertaken by Operation 
PUSH, Jackson tried to use his influence to establish trade 
between American blacks and, by extension, American 
businesses, and Africa. He stated; "It is high time for the 
nearly 3 0 million American blacks, who have a gross national 
product of some $42 billion, to start moving from lip 
service to ship service with Africa, which means black 
Americans buying products made in Africa."155 He defended 
such a concept because he felt the trade would bring much 
needed revenue to the African nations as well as causing a 
lively exchange of skills between the peoples of Africa and 
the U.S.
One of the distinguishing features of Jackson's 1984 
campaign was his ability and conviction to corner and 
discuss issues which the other candidates dare not touch.
One such issue was that of trade between the United States 
and the nations of Africa.156
155 Reynolds, 281.
156 Faw and Skelton, 208.
74
According to Jackson, U.S. foreign policy towards
Africa needed to include both trade and aid. In January
1984 Jackson stated:
The United States should seriously encourage and expand 
free trade with African nations instead of sparingly 
feeding African nations teaspoons of pitiful aid with 
strings attached as compared to what the U.S. gives to 
nations on other continents.157
As part of the Africa plank of the platform espoused by 
Jesse Jackson in 1984, the issue of trade was explicitly 
discussed. The plank called for America to "develop mutual 
economic strategies, commodities pricing and other treaties 
of international trade with nations on the African 
continent."158 As part of his address to the DNC that very 
year Jackson stated that "(w)e [the U.S.] must fight for 
trade with Africa, and not just aid to Africa."159
Jackson’s support for establishing mutually beneficial 
trading ties with Africa continued through his 1988 campaign 
and persist to this date. After Jackson visited various 
African nations in 1988, he called for the Bush 
Administration to create an aggressive policy towards 
Africa, a policy based upon joint venture which included 
trading ties as a way to promote the economic development of
157 Jackson, Straight From The Heart. 230.
158 Barker and Walters, 156.
159 Barker, 221.
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the African nations.160 However, Jackson failed to provide 
a clear meaning of what he meant by 'trade' and did not 
provide any specific trade policy suggestions.
Jesse Jackson also called for more American aid to 
Africa, aid in the form of loans, the exchange of technical 
capabilities and the provision of food and medical supplies 
for the ailing peoples of the African continent. When the 
countries of Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Nigel, Senegal and 
Upper Volta were suffering from a five-year drought in 1973, 
Jackson called for American aid. Jackson criticized the 
hypocrisy of the U.S. government because "(u)nlike America's 
urgent response to Israel during the Mid-East crisis, the 
government was strangely sluggish in shipping supplies to 
the African nations where more than 10 million people were 
threatened with starvation and sickness.1'161
This condition of hypocritic imbalance of American aid
had not become any better by 1984. Jesse Jackson called for
the cessation of such hypocrisy stating:
The United States should provide aid to Africa for 
productive economic development programs and projects of 
the same magnitude provided to Israel and for the 
reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War.
More money is provided to Israel alone in aid, grants, 
and loans than provided all black African nations 
combined. More loans are made to Mexico and Brazil than 
to all black African nations combined. This imbalance 
is unfair and creates an atmosphere unconducive to peace
160 D. Michael Cheers, "After Visit To African Nations, 
Jackson Urges Joint Partnership," Jet, 30 January 1989, 12-13.
161 Reynolds, 282.
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because it perpetuates poverty, disease, ignorance, 
fear, hate, bitterness, international terrorism, and 
unrest in the world.162
What Jackson overlooks is the African causes of the poverty,
disease, ignorance, fear, hate, etc. which persist
throughout the continent. Although he goes to great lengths
to mention the natural forces and American policy which have
a hand in the problems of Africa, he does not mention such
things as civil wars in Liberia, Ethiopia and Sudan and
dictatorial regimes elsewhere on the continent which also
play a role in causing and perpetuating the problems of
Africa. He, likewise, fails to mention that aid from
America will not be able to affect these African factors nor
the problems which they cause.
Jesse Jackson voiced criticism of the Reagan 
Administration for reducing American contributions to the 
International Development Association and the United 
Nation's Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 
organizations which Africa relied on heavily to implement 
many of its development programs. In 1984, according to 
Jackson, African nations would lose five hundred million 
dollars in much-needed aid.163
Aside from the uncertainty of the flow of concessional 
aid, the drought situation in 1984 posed another critical 
problem for African nations. More than one hundred and
162 Jackson, Straight From The Heart, 230.
163 Jackson, Africa Report, 4.
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fifty million people in over twenty African countries were 
threatened by death by starvation, and the U.S. contributed 
only eleven percent of the estimated need for the affected 
nations. According to Jackson, this represented "a meager 
sum when the U.S. historically has provided about 50 percent 
of the emergency food aid in similar cases."164
When Jackson addressed the Democratic National 
Convention in 1988, he argued for increased aid to the 
African nations. He stated that the U.S. could act to end 
the desperation that burdened Africa,165 desperation caused 
by disease, drought and poverty which continued to plague 
the nations of Africa.
In 1989 Jackson again criticized the imbalance of aid 
provided to other countries by the United States. He cited 
the fact that "(h)alf of all our foreign aid goes to Israel 
and Egypt, and half of the U.S. defense budget, $150 
billion, goes to Europe and Japan. Africa is too rich (in 
natural resources) to be so poor,"166 illustrating further 
his belief that Africa deserved its fair share of American 
aid. He failed to mention that while some African nations 
have abundant natural resources which can be used to obtain 
wealth, others have very few resources. Jackson, 
nevertheless, saw the opportunity for mutually beneficial
164 Ibid.
165 Jackson, Black Scholar, January/February 1989.
166 Cheers, Jet, 30 January 1989, 12-13.
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relations between the U.S. and Africa. African nations 
could get the aid they desperately needed? America could get 
access to the natural resources abundant in many African 
nations.
According to Jackson, in a column he wrote in February 
1990, America seemed to have plenty of money for war, as 
evident by its contributions of money, weapons and resources 
to rebel groups throughout the world. Yet, the U.S. seemed 
to have little money to counter the destitude and 
destruction caused by poverty, drought and civil wars in 
Africa. Jackson wrote that even though America was spending 
substantial amounts of money to support rebel groups engaged 
in warfare, it had sent a pitiful fifty million dollars of 
aid which was to be distributed throughout Africa where 
hundreds of thousands of people were dying each year from 
such maladies as malaria, yellow fever, influenza, 
tuberculosis and starvation. Jackson blamed that reality on 
racism present in U.S. foreign policy, arguing for the need 
to make black African lives mean as much as white European 
lives in foreign policy.167
Jesse Jackson's view of U.S. Africa policy is that it 
must include both trade and aid. Aid is needed to help the 
African nations get on their feet and overcome the problems 
of starvation, disease and drought as well as promoting
167 Jesse Jackson, "Erase the Dirty 'R1 Word from U.S. 
Foreign Policy," Los Angeles Times, 11 February 1990.
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economic development. Trade is necessary to help the 
African nations become self-sufficient.
JESSE JACKSON ON LIBERIA:
Liberia is a unique nation on the African continent, 
unique particularly concerning its relationship with the 
United States. It was founded in the 182 0s by a small group 
of American blacks who left the United States because of 
racial discrimination and oppression.168 The slaves were 
transported back to Africa as part of a movement to end 
slavery in the U.S. and to remove blacks from white society. 
Liberia became a republic in 1847, at the prodding of the 
American Colonization Society. Prior to World War II, the 
United States helped Liberia construct a large shipping port 
and air base under the provision that the facilities could 
be used by America in a time of crisis or war. America also 
built a large hospital in Liberia; the shipping port, air 
base and the hospital were used by Allied forces in World 
War II. The U.S. then provided extensive aid to Liberia to 
fix the damage caused by the war.169
When Harvey Firestone opened up his rubber factory in 
Liberia, American economic interests became a part of that 
country for Firestone's factory provided the United States
168 Hassan B. Sisay, Big Powers and Small Nations: A Case 
Study of United States-Liberian Relations (Boston: University 
Press of America, 1985) vii.
169 Ibid., viii.
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with a much-needed rubber source.170 Liberia was founded 
by black Americans, it was given military equipment in 
return for use of facilities by the U.S. during a crisis, it 
contained an important American economic interest and was 
often given both military and economic aid by the United 
States.
It is very interesting to examine Jesse Jackson's 
opinions concerning an African nation with such a unique tie 
to the U.S. On November 20, 1972, Jackson led a PUSH 
delegation to Monrovia, Liberia, a trip designed to develop 
a plan whereby American blacks could acquire dual U.S. - 
Liberian citizenship. Jackson hoped this could be 
accomplished because a similar arrangement was enjoyed by 
American Jews in Israel.171
Under Liberian law at the time, only citizens could own 
real estate. Formalization of the proposed dual citizenship 
pact would have enabled black Americans to own property in 
the African state. Although the pact drew a "warm reaction" 
from the liberian leader, President William Tolbert, and his 
cabinet, it was never to become a reality. The forces in 
Washington, although never publicly denouncing the idea, did 
not put any effort into passing the proposed dual- 
citizenship initiative.172
170 Ibid., 180.
171 Reynolds, 281.
172 Ibid. , 282-283.
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In 198 2 Jackson once again was working to better the 
way that Liberia was treated by the United States. He 
condemned the U.S. treatment of political refugees stating 
that the "refugees - bankers, diplomats, and other former 
government officials - who only a few years ago were staunch 
allies of the United States today cannot even get a green 
card to work in this country."173 Jackson's condemnation 
was rooted in what he considered to be racism and hypocrisy 
in U.S. foreign policy.
When the civil war erupted in Liberia in 1990, the 
United States, in Jackson's opinion, could not figure out 
how to respond or what measures to take. In August of that 
year Jackson wrote that despite the massacres of many 
innocent Liberians, the U.S. responded weakly condemning 
such acts and urging a cease-fire between the two sides. 
According to Jackson, the American response could have been 
much stronger because of the 'special relationship' between 
the two nations, over 400 Americans were in the country and 
could not leave because all roads were blocked and the 
airport closed, American economic interests - such as the 
Firestone Tire and Rubber Company - were at stake and 
innocent human beings were being killed. Yet, America chose 
not to intervene.174 Although Jackson is opposed to
173 Jackson, straight From The Heart. 74.
174 Jesse Jackson, "Lacking a Cold War, U.S. Draws a 
Blank," Los Angeles Times, 2 August 1990.
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unilateral action taken by the U.S. in a foreign nation to 
further American interests while simultaneously denying the 
population of that country its right to self-determination, 
such as his condemnation of the U.S. invasion of Panama, he 
supports unilateral action taken by the United States if it 
is necessary to protect the lives and rights of the masses, 
such as his support of unilateral intervention by the U.S. 
in Kuwait during the Persian Gulf Crisis and in Liberia 
during its civil war.
Jackson wrote that the decision not to intervene more
strongly was made:
(b)ecause human decency, special relationships and 
American business interests aside, Liberia is an early 
sacrificial lamb to the end of the Cold War. The basis 
of the Cold War was fear of the spread of communism. Now 
that the scare of communism in Africa is largely gone, 
Liberia no longer has strategic value to the United 
States.175
Jackson saw the Bush Administration, no longer having the 
fear of communism on which to base foreign policy, as not 
capable of figuring out an alternative policy. When faced 
with the Liberian civil war, the U.S. government "drew a 
blank and froze."176
Although favoring unilateral action by the U.S. in this 
case, he always considered multilateral action as a better 
alternative. Thus, Jackson urged the Bush Administration to 
convene an emergency session of the United Nations Security
175 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
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Council. At this session, Jackson hoped that those involved 
would send U.N. Security Forces to Liberia to stop fighting 
and to re-establish order and stability. He felt that the 
forces should remain in Liberia to protect the citizens 
until the country regained its self-governing capability.
He also called for the United States, due to its 'special 
relationship' with Liberia, to be prepared for an enormous 
emergency relief effort to soften the tragic blows suffered 
by Liberia.177
Jesse Jackson has used the special relationship which 
binds the United States to Liberia to defend a more balanced 
and fair foreign policy concerning the nation. Underlying 
the special relationship argument is a humanitarian concern 
and a condemnation of hypocrisy, racism and opportunism 
prevalent in U.S. Africa policy.
JESSE JACKSON'S EVALUATION OF U.S. AFRICA POLICY;
Long before Jesse Jackson entered into politics, it was 
evident that he was highly critical of U.S. foreign policy 
concerning the nations of Africa. As early as 1969 Jackson 
publicly denounced the U.S. government because, even though 
the United States had the resources necessary to solve the 
problems of sickness and starvation in Africa, it did 
not.178 However, Jackson did not tell how American
177 Ibid.
178 "Playboy Interview: Jesse Jackson," Playboy, 1969.
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resources could solve the problems of sickness or starvation 
when they were caused by civil war or a dictatorial regime. 
When Jackson decided to throw his hat into the political 
arena by running for the democratic presidential nomination 
of 1984, his criticisms of U.S. Africa policy not only 
continued, they became more intense.
In his 1984 campaign, Jackson stated that Africa held a 
low priority in U.S. foreign policy. He cited three reasons 
for the "low priority given to African issues in foreign 
policy formulation:"
1) priority was given to strategic and geopolitical 
factors aimed at containing communism,
2) African leaders took a nonaligned posture in the 1960s 
which allayed the fears of U.S. policymakers who had 
thought that the Soviet Union was going to seize 
Africa from Western control,
3) racial calculations by U.S. policymakers who tried to 
steer clear of Africa so as to escape any possible 
racial blunders which would 'add fuel to the fire1 of 
the already intense civil rights movement.179
During the campaign Jackson, citing the low priority 
accorded to Africa in U.S. foreign policy, questioned why 
America had chosen not to make a greater impact in Africa.
He wondered:
(w)hy is there no single state in Africa that this 
country can show to the nations of the world, and to 
herself, as a shining example, a very beautiful 
demonstration, and an excellent model of American rugged 
capitalism, of the free-enterprise system in a 
democratic society?180
179 Jackson, Africa Report, 4.
180 Jackson, Straight From The Heart, 228.
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Jackson, it became apparent, advocated a U.S. foreign policy 
which put much greater emphasis on Africa and African 
issues.
The U.S. foreign policy which did involve Africa, 
however, came under serious scrutiny from Jackson. He saw 
U.S. policy towards South Africa as immoral and inhumane 
when America was in 'partnership' with that country's 
apartheid regime. He condemned the U.S. for its imbalance 
of aid which accorded much less aid to Africa than it did to 
Europe and selected countries in the Middle East such as 
Israel and Egypt, while simultaneously arguing that the U.S 
foreign policy did not go far enough in establishing trading 
ties between the United States and the nations of Africa. 
Jackson was also highly critical of the way that U.S. policy 
embraced Liberia when it needed that country, but soon after 
turned its back on the nation.
Jesse Jackson offered criticism of U.S. Africa policy, 
but he was also quick to offer suggestions on how to improve 
upon it. Jackson stated that, when developing a policy for 
Africa, policymakers needed to remember some basic 
principles. First and foremost was that not all U.S. 
citizens were European descendants, many were African 
descendants. Second, Africa had to be considered as 
important to the United States, as much a part of the 
heritage of the United States and as much a part of U.S. 
foreign policy as were the European nations, Israel, Japan,
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Canada, etc. Third, the U.S. government could capitalize on 
the significant strides it had made concerning race 
relations and civil rights since the 1960s and use them as a 
foundation on which to base relations with African 
nations.181
Fourth, the United States government should accord the 
same preferential treatment with respect to economic and 
military ties to friendly African governments as it does to 
friendly European governments, Canada, Japan, etc. Fifth, 
America should provide similar amounts of aid to African 
nations through the African Development Bank as it did to 
other nations through the Inter-American Development Bank. 
Sixth, the United States should work out a treaty with 
Africa concerning cultural and social exchanges.182
If these principles were considered by U.S. 
policymakers when constructing policy concerning Africa, 
Jackson felt that a fair, egalitarian policy could be 
created. For Jackson, a fair, egalitarian U.S. Africa 
policy needed to fulfill various objectives:
1) cut all ties with the de Klerk regime and help put an 
end the apartheid system,
2) help Africa make effective use of its human and 
material resources,
3) give full support of the American values of freedom, 
justice and self-determination,
4) encourage egalitarian distribution of land,
5) promote multilateral aid to be used for African 
development,
181 Jackson, Straight From The Heart, 229.
182 Ibid., 229-230.
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6) share technology and information on how to solve the 
problem of the desertification of Africa,
7) allow the U.S. to be a mediator in regional disputes,
8) negotiate for peace in the sections of Africa which 
are devastated by war and conflict.183
In Jesse Jackson's view, the U.S. Africa policy of the 
past, including the Reagan years, and persisting under 
George Bush is not based upon the correct principles and is 
not aimed at appropriate objectives. Thus, he has been, and 
will continue to be, highly critical of American fgreign 
policy concerning Africa.
CONCLUSION:
Much like his foreign policy opinions with regard to 
the Middle East and Central America, Jesse Jackson's Africa 
policy has, as its foundation, a dedication to the 
preservation of human rights and the furthering of both 
human fulfillment and human well-being. Such a foundation 
is clearly present in Jackson's fight to end the oppressive 
and racist apartheid 'system of South Africa, his advocation
of both American trade and American aid to improve the lives
/
of Africans, his condemnation of the United States for not 
taking a more aggressive posture when innocent Liberians 
were slaughtered during the civil war of 1990, and his 
critique of various aspects of U.S. foreign policy 
concerning the nations of Africa.
183 Jackson, Africa Report, 8.
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Much unlike his foreign policy stances concerning the 
Middle East and Central America, Jackson's Africa policy is 
substantially devoid of specific suggestions. He chooses to 
use the general terms of 'trade' and 'aid,' but does not 
mention any specific trade policy suggestions nor does he go 
into detail concerning how the U.S. would decide which 
African nation gets how much aid or who will distribute the 
aid. He also does not discuss the fact that many of 
Africa's problems are rooted in things, such as civil war, 
which neither U.S. aid nor trade will be able to remedy.
Jackson promotes the idea that the United States to 
take a much more active role in Africa and to put Africa 
into a more prominent position on the American foreign 
policy agenda. But Jackson does not consider the fact that 
many African nations may be against having U.S. 'Big 
Brother' imperialism present in their countries. Nations 
may shy away from American trade and aid because of the 
'strings,' whether explicit or implicit, attached to the 
gesture. Jackson also fails to take into account that other 
countries in the world may not look favorably upon American 
influence throughout the African continent.
VCONCLUSION
THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF JACKSON1S FOREIGN POLICY: 
Jackson's foreign policy stances are rooted in his 
dedication to human rights and the furthering of human 
fulfillment and well-being. This should come as little 
surprise given Jackson's background. As a civil rights 
activist, he promoted a domestic policy which placed a very 
high value on the rights of all people living in the United 
States. Having experienced blatant racism in his youth, he 
decided to fight against racial segregation and white 
supremacy; he strove to make the phrase 'all were created 
equal' as applicable to blacks as it was to whites.
As a member of the SCLC, a leader of PUSH and the 
founder of the Rainbow Coalition, Jackson worked to advance 
the interests of blacks, at first, and all people as time 
progressed. He sees human rights as being guaranteed to 
people regardless of such things as the color of their skin, 
the religion they practice and their sexual preference. 
Jackson pictures his 'coalition' as including Arabs and
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Jews, blacks, lesbians, gays, American farmers, American 
Indians, Asian-Americans, Hispanics and whites?184 his is 
a Coalition' for all which embraces "a spectrum of people 
of different colors: whites, browns, reds, yellows and 
blacks.,|185
Jackson wanted to, and still wants to, improve the 
living condition of all Americans. His domestic goals 
included such things as feeding the hungry, clothing the 
naked and setting the captive free.186 Jackson viewed the 
civil rights struggle as a war not between blacks and 
whites, but as a war between the 'haves' and the 'have nots' 
of America.187 In fact, one of his critiques of the Reagan 
Administration was that under it, the "gap between the haves 
and the have nots has widened."188
At the annual convention of Push in 1980, Jackson
stated that the civil rights movement had international
implications and was not merely a national concern.
According to Jackson:
PUSH is a controversial organization because it 
consciously identifies with the poor, the rejected, and
184 Barker and Walters, 49? and Barker, 214.
185 John J. Harrigan, Political Change in the Metropolis 
(Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989), 143.
186 Reynolds, 352.
187 Phillip Drotning and Wesley South, Up From the Ghetto 
(New York: Cowles Book Co., Inc., 1970), 40.
188 Jesse Jackson, "When All That Glitters Is Not Gold," 
Newsweek, 9 January 1989.
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the oppressed, and any organization that so identifies 
itself will have mixed views about it. PUSH consciously 
seeks social, economic, political and legal justice and 
is striving for a more humane and peaceful nation and 
world in which to live ...
PUSH, as a national human rights organization with 
national and international concerns, is concerned with 
the quantity and quality of our lives and refuses to be 
limited solely to so-called black or ethnic concerns.
... We want to share and participate at every level in 
the burdens and the responsibilities of helping to 
create a new national and world order.189
When Jackson decided to run for President, he brought 
the civil rights movement to a higher plane.190 He hoped 
to enlarge the civil rights movement so that it would become 
a war between the haves and have nots of the world rather 
than merely those in the United States. Jackson's 
campaigns, therefore, were intended to accomplish many of 
the same goals and objectives as the civil rights movement, 
this time in an international setting.191
In essence, Jackson has merely exported this domestic 
policy overseas and over borders, using it as the basis for 
his foreign policy. In fact, he sees a direct relationship 
between foreign and domestic policy? according to Jackson, a 
"separation between foreign and domestic policy is a false 
distinction."192 Jackson sees all people as citizens of 
the world rather than of specific nations and argues for the
189 Jackson, Straight From The Heart, 289.
190 Newsweek, November/December 1984, 52.
191 Barker, 39.
192 Jackson, Straight From The Heart, 294.
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advancement and furthering of human rights, human 
fulfillment and well-being for all.
When Jackson evaluated U.S. foreign policy, he based
his evaluations upon the human rights implications of the
policy as well as how well the policy furthered justice in
the world. Jackson was a staunch advocate of furthering
human rights abroad.193 For him, one of the primary
emphases of his foreign policy was "to measure human rights
by one yardstick,11194 and this was what he expected of U.S.
foreign policy. Jackson argued for consistency in the
application of democratic values abroad, stating:
We can't define democracy as majority rule in North 
America and as minority rule in South Africa. We can't 
impose economic sanctions in Poland because of martial 
law and then become South Africa's number-one trading 
partner. We just want the game played by one set of 
rules.195
Jackson saw grave consequences in what he considered 
the 'double standard' for measuring human rights in U.S. 
foreign policy. He stated that such a standard affected 
American interests because the inconsistency would hinder 
the United States from having the moral authority required 
to influence world public opinion. According to Jackson, 
"(t)he real U.S. 'window of vulnerability' is not our lack
193 Jesse Jackson, "A Chance to Serve," Black Scholar, 
March/April 1988.
194 Jackson, Straight From The Heart, xiv.
195 Ibid., 21.
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of military preparedness, but the lack of a consistent human 
rights policy."196
Through his protest activity, Jackson played an 
integral role in ending the segregation in Greensboro in the 
1960s, thereby hoping that the U.S. domestic policy would 
insure that the human rights of Americans, both black and 
white, would be measured using the same 'yardstick.' This 
background obviously led Jackson to want the same 'one 
yardstick' approach in the international arena. This is 
evident through many of Jackson's statements and positions 
on issues.
Jackson argued for allowing Palestinian self- 
determination while simultaneously guaranteeing Israeli 
security. He wanted to see Palestinians given the same 
human rights as were afforded to the Israelis and others. 
Jackson also argued against the support provided to the 
Contras by the United States because such support 
represented aiding rebel forces in an attempted overthrow of 
a legitimate regime which had the support of the Nicaraguan 
masses.
One critique Jackson had of U.S. Africa policy was of 
the 'partnership' which existed between the U.S. government 
and the government of South Africa, a criticism based in the 
fact that the South African apartheid regime was racist and 
repressive. Jackson was also highly critical of the Reagan
196 Ibid., 75.
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Administration's decision to invade Panama and to forcibly
detain that nation's leader, Manuel Noriega.
All of the above examples illustrate that Jackson 
evaluates foreign policy based upon human rights and 
advocates a foreign policy rooted in human rights. He 
supported granting the Palestinians, Nicaraguans and 
Panamanians the right to self-determination and giving black 
South Africans the same rights as those held by the minority 
white population of that country.
Aside from human rights, Jackson also evaluates foreign 
policy on the basis of justice. He "fastens to justice as 
the touchstone for policy evaluation .1,197 Jackson began 
by fighting the injustice of racism in America, but later
expanded his sights to fight injustice wherever it
existed,198 and that is a goal he also sees as vital to 
U.S. foreign policy.
Jackson argued for a more 'evenhanded' U.S. Middle East 
policy, a more just policy which considered and included 
both Arab and Israeli interests. He likewise argued that 
American foreign policy needed to treat African nations 
justly by treating them as it treated Canada, Japan and 
European nations.
197 June Jordan, "Next Time the Rainbow," New Statesman, 
6 January 1989.
198 Drotning and South, 33.
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The importance of justice for Jackson was also present 
when he was speaking on behalf of Mexican laborers. He 
wanted the U.S. government to work with the Mexican 
government to help the situation of Mexican workers. He 
wanted to insure that Mexican laborers were not forced to 
work under conditions which were unacceptable by American 
standards. He was opposed to the fact that U.S. and 
Japanese firms were locating in Mexico to avoid tougher 
environmental laws, unions and labor restrictions, and 
simultaneously paying unfairly low wages. Jackson also 
criticized the use of economic sanctions by the U.S. 
government in Panama because they crippled the economy of 
the country and unjustly hurt the masses.
Besides being rooted in human rights and justice, 
Jackson’s foreign policy stances were also based in the need 
to further human fulfillment and well-being. When Jackson 
went to Syria, Iraq, Cuba, etc. to help negotiate for the 
release of hostages or prisoners, he was working to regain 
peoples' freedom so that they would be able to live their 
lives in a fulfilling manner at a safe place. When Jackson 
went to Jamaica, the Caribbean, Armenia and other places 
where natural disasters had occurred, one of his reasons for 
going was to get aid for those affected by the disasters by 
providing a much larger audience for their plight. Although 
the publicity Jackson received from such trips benefitted
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him, he was also genuinely interested in trying to further 
human fulfillment and well-being.
When Jackson advocated American trade and aid for 
African nations, he did so hoping to make the nations self- 
sufficient. Through self-sufficiency, Jackson thought the 
nations would be better equipped to help their populations 
lead fulfilling lives in a secure environment. The peace 
processes in the Middle East, Central America and Africa to 
which Jackson was so devoted also would provide, he hoped, a 
stable and secure environment in which the people could 
grow.
Might does not make right in the realm of foreign 
affairs, in Jackson's view, and he was highly skeptical of 
the use of U.S. military force to accomplish its goals 
internationally. A good example of this was his 
condemnation of the U.S. invasion of Panama; Jackson 
criticized the invasion because the U.S. had used its 
military muscle to take a ruler from his country. Jackson's 
opposition was to the end at which the Panamanian invasion 
was aimed. According to Jackson, might can and should 
effectively be a part of U.S. foreign policy only if used in 
the pursuit of the right goals, if used in the service of 
right.
Jackson wanted the U.S. to be 'right' in its actions in 
the world so that it could have moral authority. And, U.S. 
foreign policy was not right in many cases in Jackson's
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opinion. To be right it needed to be consistent and 
persistent in the pursuit of human rights, human fulfillment 
and human well-being everywhere. For Jackson, the U.S. 
could make itself right by helping the Palestinian people 
get a homeland, working to dissolve the great disparity 
between the rich and the poor of Gulf states such as Saudi 
Arabia, no longer supporting Contra forces and striving to 
end the apartheid regime of South Africa.
Jackson's foreign policy proposals emphasize respect, 
talk and negotiations over confrontation, gunboat diplomacy, 
big-stick diplomacy and military adventurism.199 Jackson
favored "peaceful diplomacy abroad"200 and placed a high 
priority on negotiation as a tool in foreign affairs. As 
Jackson proved in his negotiations with President Assad of 
Syria for the release of American hostage Lieutenant 
Goodman, negotiation can be effective. In fact, his 
negotiations with Assad, the Sandinistas, Castro and other 
leaders in the Middle East, Central America and Africa have 
established the precedent for future negotiations in the 
world.201
Although Jackson was wary of using U.S. might and 
gunboat diplomacy, he did see it as a viable option in
199 Jackson, Straight From The Heart, xiv.
200 Roger Wilkins, "On Being Uppity," Mother Jones, June 
1990, 8.
201 Landess and Quinn, 153.
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service of the right ends. The use of the United States 
Armed Forces to liberate the country of Kuwait from Iraqi 
aggression in the Persian Gulf Crisis was supported by 
Jackson because, after channels of negotiation and peaceful 
diplomacy were exhausted, might was used in the service of 
right.
Another important principle of U.S. foreign policy for 
Jesse Jackson is that it should not be based upon a war 
against the spread of communism. The nations of the world, 
in his view, were not to be used as a battlefield for a war 
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.; to stop the spread of 
communism was not a sufficient reason to intervene in other 
regions of the world. Jackson did, and does, not see 
communism as the enemy or the cause of all of the world's 
woes?202 in fact, he criticized the Reagan Administration 
for using the need to thwart the threat of communism as a 
foundation for American foreign policy.
Therefore, Jackson opposed U.S. support given to the 
Contras solely because the legitimate Sandinista government 
is a socialist form of government. He also sought to open 
up and to establish relations between the United States and 
communist Cuba.
In fact, Jackson has used Liberia as an example of what 
happens when foreign policy is based upon the threat of 
communism. With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s,
202 Faw and Skelton, 177.
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the U.S. no longer needed to use Liberia as a roadblock to 
Soviet intervention on the African continent. Thus, when a 
civil war erupted in that country, the U.S. drew a blank on 
how to deal with the situation. This, for Jackson, is a 
clear illustration of what can occur when U.S. foreign 
policy is not rooted in proper objectives.
Jesse Jackson's foreign policy leanings also illustrate 
that he is a Third World advocate. In his address to the 
1988 Democratic National Convention he argued for the need 
to change U.S. policy towards the Third World so that it was 
consistent with U.S. policy elsewhere.203 His support is 
for the rights of Third World nations, particularly their 
right to self-determination.
Implicit within his advocacy for the Third World was a
simultaneous condemnation of the Reagan Administration for
its narrow vision and its perception of the threat of
communism. Jackson stated:
The Reagan Administration has viewed the Third World as 
a chessboard in which a struggle for pawns and positions 
is played with the Soviet Union. "The Soviet Union," 
President Reagan said, "lies behind all the trouble 
spots in the world."
... But the Reagan Doctrine is based on a fundamental 
misconception of the world. The countries of the Third 
World are not drawn to communism. They struggle against 
unimaginable poverty, against the legacy of colonialism, 
against underdevelopment, malnutrition and hunger. They 
contend with the mighty currents of nationalism and
203 Jackson, Black Scholar, January/February 1989.
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religion. They tend towards non-alignment, for they 
seek aid and investment wherever they can find it.
Jackson has argued for the need of the United States to
redefine its relationship with the Third World; he has
promoted a new foreign policy doctrine which he regards as
being grounded in a more sensible view of the world, the
Jackson Doctrine.
Jackson outlined this new doctrine in an issue brief he 
prepared for his 1988 campaign for the Democratic 
presidential nomination. In that brief he wrote that the 
Jackson Doctrine is based upon four principles;
1) Support and strengthen the 'Rule of International 
Law; '
2) Respect the right of self-determination;
3) Promote human rights; and
4) Support international economic justice and 
development.205
As a global power with diverse interests, Jackson sees 
the U.S. as having 'the greatest stake' in respecting and 
strengthening the rule of international law. According to 
Jackson, "(i)f our interests abroad are seen as legitimate, 
they will be protected by the society involved. If they are 
seen as an intrusion, there is no military force in the 
world strong enough to protect them."206 He condemned the
204 Jesse Jackson, Keep Hope Alive (Boston; Little, Brown 
and Co., 1989), 189.
205 Ibid., 195-196.
206 Ibid.
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U.S. for not accepting the World Court decision when it 
found the U.S. guilty of violating international law by 
mining the Nicaraguan harbors, stating that the U.S. needed 
to respect and strengthen such institutions as the World 
Court and the United Nations.
The Jackson Doctrine also contains the need to respect 
the right of self-determination. Jackson realizes that the 
countries of the Third World will have varying social and 
political experiments, but, in his opinion, "(t)hey have the 
right to choose their own destiny - to find their own ways 
to cope with poverty, illiteracy and political 
representation. We must respect that right, confident that 
democracy and freedom are spreading in the world."207 This 
idea came through when Jackson voiced his support of 
Palestinian and El Salvadoran self-determination.
The third principle of the Jackson Doctrine is to 
promote human rights. This principle finds itself at the 
root of Jackson's evaluation of U.S. foreign policy as well 
as his own foreign policy stances.
The final principle of the Jackson Doctrine is the 
support of international economic justice and development in 
the Third World. Jackson argued that "growth and prosperity 
in the United States requires raising the standard of living 
in the Third World, not lowering our own."208To fulfill
207 Ibid., 196.
208 Ibid.
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this task Jackson saw the need to create a new capital fund 
for development projects, the provision of debt relief, 
promotion of self-reliance and the equitable distribution of 
resources and a code of conduct for American multinational 
corporations.
The Jackson Doctrine provides the basic framework for 
what Jackson considers to be the principles upon which U.S. 
foreign policy should be based as well as the objectives it 
ought to seek to attain. It puts emphasis on the need to 
promote human rights, to further human fulfillment and well­
being, to consider the interests of all nations and to be 
consistent in its application. Also, it is not based upon a 
foundation as shaky as the fear of communist advancement. 
Jackson argues for U.S. foreign policy to be balanced and 
consistent and to be a part of the global struggle for "true 
and total equality."209
209 Jesse Jackson, "A Challenge to the New Generation," 
Ebony, August 1990, 135.
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